THE LOGIC OF SOVIET PRODUCTION AND INEQUALITY AS ITS AFTERMATH

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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the common prejudices of the Soviet workers, or Soviet citizens in general, is that they were so egalitarian that they could not bear economic inequality of any kind. It is assumed that Soviet society as a whole was organized based upon an egalitarian principle, to which the people were accustomed for more than seven decades. To be true, the Soviet regime eagerly attempted to build up an egalitarian society and the gap between the rich and the poor was stabilized at an acceptably low level throughout the Soviet era. However, such a simple mapping of Soviet society does not explain why the population have remained inactive in the face of increasing income disparity after the fall of the old system, if they have really been egalitarian to the bone for a long time.

Nowadays, at the level of workplace, although you can quite often hear ordinary workers complaining about the managers’ huge bonus and their allegedly illegitimate extra money, their discontents hardly develop into organizing a collective action.

In practice, Soviet workers were hierarchically arranged in accordance with their work skills and experiences. This hierarchical order provided veteran workers having a higher labor degree with not only respect from co-workers and managers but also socio-economical privileges, if they were sometimes minimal from today’s point of view. In a sense, during the Soviet era the workers lived with a unique kind of hierarchical system which nevertheless managed to fix up inequality at a tolerable level and to make the people accept it as a
matter of life. What happened in the Russian enterprise since the introduction of a market economy is the transformative tightening of differential order among the workers together with transposing ‘the spiritual’ to the material, rather than creating the unknown inequality.

Why, then has this hierarchical order been taken for granted in the former socialist country that placed so much emphasis on equality? How does it appear so “fair and just” to the workers? In this paper, I shall suggest that the hierarchy among both manual workers and the employees in the workplace as a whole stems from the internally differentiated nature of the production process itself. This does not mean, however, that in all kinds of productive processes the division of labor should inevitably result in a hierarchical order, nor that production has the inherent power to arrange people into a pre-established ranking system.

Throughout human history, production has always existed as part of the array of human activities that satisfy various human needs in order to secure survival. However, that the domain of production is to be analysed in terms of invested labor and to be isolated as the ultimate source of wealth is a novel development of nineteenth century economic thought. As Foucault (1970, 275-278) indicates, for Adam Smith the quantity of labor is merely the unit to measure the wealth and the equivalent sum of exchange, while Ricardo envisages labor giving birth to value that is contained in products prior to exchange (Foucault 1970, 240-245). This precedence of production is recognised in relation to scarcity and labor, which in turn leads to the fulfilment of an end to History (Foucault 1970, 285). Foucault thus attributes the main accomplishment of nineteenth century economic thought to Ricardo, inasmuch as he makes an epistemological break with the economic thinking of the Classical Age. This is not merely an academic discourse, but an outcome of what Foucault calls episteme—a certain implicit knowledge which “makes possible at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice” (Foucault 1997, 262).

The notions of production, labor and history based upon nineteenth century episteme underwent a unique modification after the 1917 revolution, when different occupations, jobs and professions, as well as other facets of socio-economic life came to be reassessed and rated. These evaluations were articulated in accordance with Marxist-Leninist doctrine by the regime’s leadership that conceived of them as a basis of a modernisation rationale, but the notions were also grounded as such in the minds of the population as industrialisation proceeded. For example, Stalin’s 1931 speech which attacked “wage equalisation” marked a turning point in the labor policy (Stalin 1976, 532-559), and aimed to limit labor turnover in the manufacturing industry (Kumomiya 1988, 280-286). Although it might be seen as a deviation from the Communist ideal, the system of differential wages and prestige had now laid a foundation of a factory regime which lasted until the fall of the planned economy with the general approval of the people.
The introduction of a market economy has not completely expelled the foundational notions of the factory regime and the employee’s way of life based upon them, but rather has entailed a compromised leeway where the people try to defend what they perceive as their legitimate right, particularly when they feel the return for their labor to be unrewarding. Through this particular, cultural logic of production and labor, those engaged in ‘non-productive labor’ such as trading and banking are underrated, and their wealth is illegitimated in contrast with rightful privilege inherited from the Soviet era (Humphrey 1999).

The sociologist Simon Clarke maintains that changes in the status hierarchy among the industrial workers in general have given way to a homogenisation of the working class, except for the gender division of labor (Clarke 1996). The ending of the planned economy, he argues, has removed the skilled workers in the main production, as well as in military and heavy industry, from their former privileged status, while the dismissal of working pensioners and unskilled surplus labor has compressed the diverse statuses within the working mass. The homogenisation tendency of the working class, together with the polarisation of owners, managers and workers, paves the way for class formation and class conflict.¹ His argument might point to some aspects of changes to be observed in the Russian working mass as a whole, but on the ground, the restructuring process has taken place based upon the pre-established hierarchy among manual workers, not doing away with it. The differential valuation of labor still operates not only as a principle for the organisation of the labor force but also as a moral point of reference for workers.

It is their own distinctive valuation of labor that provides workers with a moral basis of social justice and resistance. However, in so far as the hierarchy based upon this morality is alive, in spite of their deteriorated status as a whole, workers pursue individualistic solutions rather than striving for the unity as a single working class to improve their lot. It also seems uncertain that the workers in general are on the way to homogenisation, as Clarke argues. I suggest that even if homogenisation might take place, it gives birth to other criteria for the different valuation of labor by workers. In this paper, I will first examine the historical roots of the hierarchical order among workers, before turning to the current processes through which workers come to feel insecure about their jobs and are demoralised but still judge the value of the various jobs by their contributions to the society.

In order to convey ordinary workers’ voice, this paper draws heavily on my fieldwork data in a few factories of Irkutsk and its neighboring cities during 2001-2002 and 2003. The main research site for this paper is a printing house which used to employ about 500 people in the 1980s before the lay-off of more than 250 people in 1996-97. With the lay-off, five workshops were incorporated

¹ Later Clarke seems to admit that his initial hope for the unity of the working class in Russia based on the homogenisation tendency has not realised but that the diversification of the status among the working class has instead become the main stream (See Clarke 1999).
into two: the book and journal workshop and newspaper workshop. It still remains as state-owned enterprise as of 2008. The Shelekhov Machine-Repair Factory was privatized in 1992 and the Director owns the majority of the share. The car battery maker, NovTekh is a private company, reborn out of a bankrupt military complex, whose young director (38 years old) is currently employed by the owner of a conglomerate.

**FROM EGOALITARIAN TO DIFFERENTIAL WAGE SYSTEM IN THE SOVIET ERA**

It was the early 1930s when the initially conflicting policies on differential pay-scale and rationing converged into what would become the basic structure of the hierarchy among manufacturing workers for more than five decades to come. Throughout the New Economic Policy (NEP), there were strongly popular demands from below for social equality, and the wage-scale reform of 1927-29 successfully reduced wage differentials among workers. “Indeed, wage differentiation in terms of decimal ratios from highest to lowest wages narrowed from 3.60 in 1927 to 3.33 in 1930... Numerous cases were reported in which both skilled and unskilled workers were paid equally” (Kuromiya 1988, 246). Whereas skilled workers were in the beginning uninterested in the change in pay-scale because there were not so many items to buy with the earned money, the reinforced rationing introduced in 1929 almost eliminated the previously considerable differentials in consumption among workers. The Party leadership never officially encouraged or approved the wage and rationing equalisation, but tolerated it. They were more concerned about the probable, separate grouping of skilled “old workers” with better wages and privileges among manual workers, as new arrivals from the countryside had joined in the manufacturing industry on a massive scale. They felt it imperative to incorporate new arrivals into the working mass and to homogenise working mass as a whole. It was around this time when production collectives (kollektivy) and communes (kommuny), in which workers shared their wages on an equal basis and set a higher self-norm of productivity and discipline, mushroomed across manufacturing industries.

According to Siegelbaum, collectives and communes, as a voluntary movement from those below, contributed positively to production through utopian optimism and labor enthusiasm, although many, opportunistic unskilled workers joined in to get more wages from pooling (Siegelbaum 1986). However, the formation of collectives and communes, the wage and rationing equalisation, together with the introduction of modern technology, made many skilled workers grumble and leave the factory to seek other jobs. Since it was the skilled workers who were in an acute shortage at this stage of the industrialisation

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2 The causes for the levelling trends during this period were diverse. See Kumomiya (1988, 244-250).
drive, their departure from or drifting around factories was, increasingly, an alarming sign for the leadership. “Finally, by 1931 the political reason for maintaining a certain degree of economic homogeneity among workers had become less compelling” because “bourgeois” elements (kulaks, old specialists, NEP-men) that, the leadership felt, might influence the proletariat, had already disappeared (Kumomiya 1988, 280). In this atmosphere came Stalin’s speech in 1931 that put the problem of supply and fluidity of manpower as a priority among the new conditions created by the development of industry. Stalin declared:

What is the cause of the fluidity of manpower? The cause of the wrong structure of wages, the wrong wage scales, the “Leftist” practice of wage equalisation. In a number of factories wage scales are drawn up in such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. The consequence of wage equalisation is that the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement; as a result he feels himself a “visitor” in the factory, working only temporarily so as to “earn a little money” and then go off to “try his luck” in some other place. The consequence of wage equalisation is that the skilled worker is obliged to go from factory to factory until he finds one where his skill is properly appreciated... In order to put an end to this evil we must abolish wage equalisation and discard the old wage scales. In order to put an end to this evil we must draw up wage scales that will take into account the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. We cannot tolerate a situation where a rolling-mill worker in the iron and steel industry earns no more than a sweeper (Stalin 1976, 538).

This was a clear program as the Party policy for widening differentials in wage and rationing, and it was welcome by industrial managers, specialists and skilled workers. Following this new course, communes and collectives began to be disbanded. Of course, “there were signs of resistance: specialists baiting did not entirely disappear, and the egalitarian ethos was not eliminated by fiat” (Kuromiya 1988, 286). However, Kuromiya evaluates this new course as “the initiative for the move toward the restoration of order” (Kuromiya 1988, 285). For the Party leadership, the reinforcement of managerial authority, material incentives and legal sanctions against indiscipline, rather than workers’ communes and collectives, were seen as the remedy to labor turnover, absenteeism, spoilage and wastage (Siegelbaum 1986, 84). Stalin’s speech in 1931 was not just one point in the fluctuating policy between egalitarianism and differentialism as before. In 1934, Stalin again attacked “equalisation in the sphere of requirements and personal, everyday life” as a “reactionary petty bourgeois absurdity” (Stalin 1976, 741). In his 1935 speech, he did justice to differentiated, cultural and technical levels within labor, and declared that the antithesis be-
tween mental labor and physical labor would be eliminated by raising the level of working class to that of engineers and technical workers (Stalin 1976, 779).

Why, then can socialism not “be consolidated by a certain equalisation of people’s material conditions” (Stalin 1976, 777)? That is because “our country must have a productivity of labour which surpasses that of the foremost capitalist countries.” “Without this we cannot even think of securing an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds” (Stalin 1976, 777). Between the question and answer, it should be noted that Stalin simply took the material incentives as stimulating productivity for granted. According to Stalin, “The principle of socialism is that in a socialist society each works according to his ability and receives articles of consumption, not according to his needs, but according to the work he performs for society” (Stalin 1976, 778). However, this is not exclusively the principle of socialism, but can also be applied to capitalism. The ideal of capitalism too is that each works according to one’s ability and receives according to what one has performed, but that the market quantifies what one has performed, unlike Stalin’s socialism. In Stalin’s version of socialism, one’s performance should be fairly and just calculated and determined by the state. Even when one’s performance was not fully recognised in terms of material rewards, during the wage equalisation period, for example, one’s performance had ‘objectively’ and differentially contributed to production and thereby had enhanced the wealth of the country. Thus for Stalin the elimination of wage equalisation was to move toward “fairer” judgement of one’s contribution to production.

This epistemological basis corresponds to Ricardo’s political economy. For him “the value of things increases with the quantity of labor that must be devoted to them if we wish to produce them; but it does not change with the increase or decrease of the wages for which labor, like all other commodities, is exchanged” (Foucault 1970, 276). Regardless of what kind of representations things may assume, their nature in itself is organised in accordance to their own law. The problem is to find out the inherent causality existing independently from representation, and labor is the inherent element in determining the value of things prior to circulation. “After Ricardo, the possibility of exchange is based upon labor; and henceforth the theory of production must always precede that of circulation” (Foucault 1970, 277). This point is further articulated by Marx who paid attention to measuring the differentiated value of labor power.3 Marx’s labor theory of value, when interpreted and applied by the Soviet regime, offered a way of measuring the differentiated value of labor; the skilled

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3 “In order to modify the human organism, so that it may acquire skill and handiness in a given branch of industry, and become labor-power of a special kind, a special education or training is requisite, and this, on its part, costs an equivalent in commodities of a greater or less amount. This amount varies according to the more or less complicated character of the labor-power. The expenses of this education (excessively small in the case of ordinary labor-power), enter pro tanto into the total value spent in its production” (Marx 1954, 168).
labor that produces more value should be rewarded and labor engaged in production should be prioritised over that in circulation.

From this perspective, labor becomes the source of cost (wage, capital and income, profits), already distributed. Thus it is potentially that which, in a new circuit of production and thanks to it recyclable quality, originates wealth. According to Foucault, this serial accumulation in turn introduces for the first time the possibility of perceiving wealth in a temporal sequence. However, Ricardo envisions that nature’s ‘essential avarice’ will finally reach the point of the immobilisation of history, where humankind is after all shown as a finite being by the tide of History. Unlike Ricardo, Marx envisages the promise of the working class in its capacity to see through the imposed conditions of a discriminatory History (lowering wages, increasing unemployment) and to restore the truth of human essence. In both cases, economy is arranged in a continuous historical time; the historical time is pulled by labor to overcome scarcity in relation to human needs, and History will finally reconfirm or reverse the finitude of human kind at its end point. On this point, Foucault sees both of them confined in the arrangement of new knowledge formed in the nineteenth century (Foucault 1970, 285).

One might be tempted to argue that for Marx the value of a commodity is not predetermined by the amount of labor invested in it, but the value of labor is realised retrospectively only after exchanging commodities. Moreover, Marx has recognised that the conception of labor in economic thought is “as modern a category as are the relations which create this simple abstraction” (Marx 1973, 103). By doing so, one might want to insist, Marx is not merely trapped by the nineteenth century episteme, as Foucault categorises. However, the end of the discussion is not important for this paper. The point I wish to make here is that the way Marx’s labor theory of value was interpreted by the Soviet leadership was one that accorded with Foucault’s nineteenth century episteme. It thus exerted a crucial role in organising the factory regime. This specific way of viewing labor and production was forced by Stalin’s determination that “our country must have a productivity of labor which surpasses that of the foremost capitalist countries.” Although the Soviet leadership’s endeavour to strengthen the country’s wealth contradicted its own cause (Buck-Morss 2000, 1-39), once it stood up as a nation-state, it should care for and foster the economy.

Hindess demonstrates that Adam Smith and Ricardo shared a common assumption that each country had a relatively self-contained national economy. Since their era, he argues, despite the differing view on the role of market and government, “many in the conservative and socialist camp have shared the liberal belief that, if properly managed by government, the economy can be expected to provide resources for both state and society” (Hindess 1998, 211). We can now see in Stalin the same assumption of interdependence of economy, state and society, though with some variations. The introduction of a market economy surely signifies a drastic change in the Russian economy, but this
does not abolish the image of an interdependence of economy, society and state. From the workers’ point of view, the change lies in the way that their labor is evaluated; in the past workers’ labor was regarded as making a more significant contribution to economy, but specialists and managers are now seen as crucial contributors to the economy. At the same time, the differential contribution to production by diverse sections of workers is also acknowledged by a market economy. The formerly privileged status of certain workers may be levelled out by a market, but some sections of auxiliary workers (electricians and mechanics, for example) may be promoted, although this has not happened to the printing house. For workers, a specific way of evaluating a worker’s labor may be unbearable, but the differential among the workers’ labor itself is “a fact of life.” In any case, despite these upheavals that have transformed the conception of labor and production, there is an underlying unchanged notion that the accumulation of wealth (representation) can be traced down to the differential contributors (labor).

**DEMORALISED ATTITUDE TO WORK PRESENT-DAY**

Besides the aforementioned changes in the workplace the introduction of a market economy has brought with it, perhaps the most outstanding one the workers feel on a day-to-day basis is the turnover of power relations between the managers. Together with the decrease in wages and the abolition of social benefits, that has undermined the work commitment. The sociologist Simon Clarke (1999, 128) estimates that about half the industrial work forces work in enterprises which cannot survive without the aid from outside (the state). As a consequence, many of competent and skill workers tend to concentrate on a small number of prosperous enterprises, resulting in making their original workplace as a reserve of the unskilled and undisciplined. However, since the Irkutsk Printing House has been able to pay the wages on time and the workers’ job in the printing industry is so specific, the massive exodus to a better enterprise has not happened. Never the less, the demoralisation to work was not evitable, like many other ordinary enterprises.

In the Irkutsk Printing House, I was often told by the workers that work meant much more than money, but my awkward question about the meaning of work was more often answered by commonplace statements: “You need to eat. You need money.” Boris, the veteran pressman, once told me: “The work has given me money by which I have educated and have fed my children. I’ve now bought a third car. I’ve received a three-room flat from the printing house. What else would you need?” However, a worker who would explain, “In order to feed my family, I have to work,” would often, depending on situation, mode or context, add: “I love my machine. I like my work.”

Just like anywhere else, these remarks are in actuality not self-contradictory in people’s life; the instrumental view of work can comfortably coincide with
the commitment to work and enjoyment of work. Work contents consist of many elements, including material rewards, enjoyment of job, work environments, work mates, social respect and so on. Depending upon the situation, people may take one of these factors as their primary cause of work (dis)contents, while not ignoring the importance of others. Yet I sometimes felt that people’s diminished attachment to work was manifested in their acute interest in money in opposition to their loyalty to work or company.

One day in the photoset operators’ room, people expressed their disappointment about the shop chief of the newspaper workshop. The photoset operators had recently invented a new way of developing newspaper films which they thought would reduce the cost of developing by 50%. They suggested to the shop chief that the company pay them 50% of the reduced cost as an incentive if the new method should work out, but she refused to do so. Commenting that she was narrow-sighted, they then decided to go to the Director. A month later I asked one of them how their suggestion was going. He answered that the Director had also refused to give them an incentive at all. Thus they all decided not to adopt the new method and to keep it as a secret among themselves. This anecdote is contrasted to a previous episode that one of them told me about. One day the photoset operator Yaroslav pointed to a printing box in which photoset operators soak and wash the plate to imprint characters on it, proudly announcing, “I myself invented this box. The chief engineer who now works in the other company came in and heard my explanation. He said that my idea’s better, so he ordered to make it.” At the time Yaroslav had not asked money for his suggestion, and he took it as a trivial everyday matter.

As many workers said, money has always been important, whether in the Soviet era or present-day, but the anecdote above demonstrates that workers may not take voluntary action in favour of the company without material incentives. Given that workers’ positive commitment and improvisation has played a crucial role in coping with everyday problems in (post-)Soviet production (Nam 2006), the destruction of workers’ morale may do serious damage to the company. In the Soviet era, of course, it was not uncommon to encourage workers to devote themselves to work by means of material incentives. In the printing house of the 1970s, the promise of the construction of flats and an increase in wages triggered workers’ commitment to production. Workers often came to bargain over a few bottles of vodka with managers who asked for something more than routine. In the past, creative suggestions such as the reduction of printing costs were likely to get recompensed in some form, if not an immediate material return. These days, however, the company lacks either material means to offer in exchange for workers’ voluntary devotion, or a grand vision for a better future.

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4 For example, this worker might ask the chief engineer a personal favour later.
5 In many factories, however, they are still striving to provide ‘spiritual’ stimulants for workers. In the Shelekhov Machine-Repair Factory five better workers are annually elected and their photographs are displayed on the wall. In a chemical factory in Usol’iye, I saw the photographs of better workers
There are still plenty of occasions for workers to seek out a personal favour, but the management has increasingly scarce means to meet the favour. Perhaps more importantly, the nature of favour and the means to meet it has been in the process of changing. Workers’ personal problems, which make them turn to the Director, will now usually be alleviated by money. The entrance to higher education, for example, is highly priced, and a local newspaper article reports, in detail, different prices of bribe for universities and institutes (‘Prestuplenie i Obrazovanie’ Kopeika 11 November 2002: 4). In the printing house, the reduction in production volume means that more workload than expected, or a replacement of those absent, is welcome as an opportunity to increase workers’ scanty income, rather than being an object of negotiation. In a changed environment where everything is measured by money, workers’ wages have shrunk in a reverse proportion to demand and this has definitely impaired their morale. In the Soviet era the average wages in the printing house were not particularly higher than those of other manufacturing industries in Irkutsk, although those of pressmen and photoset operators were considered to be excellent. However, the printing house was able to offer benefits and privileges other than wages, and above all the Soviet economy was not primarily a monetary one.

The strengthened power of the line managers over workers is also felt to affect workers’ pride in their work. The chief of the book and journal workshop sometimes shouts at some workers, threatening dismissal even for a minor neglect of duty. While I was walking with her and passed by a mechanic one day, she told me, “He should have been dismissed long ago.” I was shocked that the shop chief pronounced on dismissal so easily to me whom she got to know only few weeks earlier. This man was said to be a quite skilled mechanic but drank very often from early in the morning. The photographer in this workshop, Viktor was considered to be a sound, skilled worker, but weak in character. He was also sometimes threatened with dismissal by the shop chief, for example when she caught him reading a newspaper. As the shop chief has made it a habit to shout rudely at workers and threaten to dismiss from the time she took the job, I realised later that workers had gotten used to it over a long time. Nevertheless, her threat now sounds different to workers after the massive lay-off in 1996-97, as she will influence the Director’s decision about dismissal, if it happens.

Moreover, many workers in the book and journal workshop often do not have a defined job they are supposed to be dedicated to. The printing industry in general requires a minute division of labor, and the characteristics of the industry were added to the existing specialisation tendency of Soviet production, giving birth to a number of subdivided jobs. For example, binding machines are displayed alongside a path leading to its main gate. As a state-owned enterprise, the Irkutsk Printing House elected three workers for state awards a couple of years before my fieldwork. Nevertheless, the Director of the printing house does not pay particular attention to deploying spiritual motivations and I consider this as his managerial style, rather than simply due to drained resources.

This is the case of the Irkutsk Printing House, but the Shelekhov Machine-Repair Factory that is currently receiving enough work order sometimes has a different problem: how to force grumbling workers into work.
broken down into several types, depending on the kind of binding and the size of books, and each worker has his/her own machine. Or else, workers work in a team of several on a conveyor (typically binding of journals). This structure of job distribution, which workers associated with the workplace, has recently been dismantled. The lay-off in 1996-97 has left a minimum number of staff for each job, but work orders are still not sufficient to keep workers working with their own job. A typesetter, for example, is often instructed to ‘help’ workers in the binding section, which in turn consists of several different types of work. The kind of work they are told to take is random but usually considered to be of a lower labor grade than their own. Workers, of course, do not like it.

Aleksei (50 years old) works on an old type of printing machine that prints large sizes of paper forms by use of typeset, without the aid of computer. This way of printing turns out a lower quality of product with obscure letters but costs less than computerised printing does. Although there are still customers who want to reduce the printing costs at the expense of the low quality, this kind of work order has become infrequent. As a consequence, Aleksei takes any jobs available, as instructed by the shop chief, when he does not have his own work. When I saw Aleksei working in the photographer Viktory’s room, while he was on leave, I asked Aleksei.

YH: Where do you work?
Aleksei: Here and there. I don’t like working here because I often forget how to do the work. How much time do I waste to recall the process! I’ve talked and talked about this to them, but they don’t understand! They also don’t want to pay me decently.
YH: Is this kind of work less profitable than yours?
Aleksei: No. It is all the same, if I do this or that. I want to do my job upstairs. Tomorrow I will return to my post to work there.

Aleksei’s job (pressman) and Viktory’s (photographer) are paid at the same hourly rate, but he still does not like doing Viktory’s job. Besides, he is often called to join the binding section where manual jobs with a lower labor grade than his are offered. Such job shifting takes place almost everyday in the book and journal shop and workers are usually called into the binding section. The only exception to this is a team of three pressmen, including a woman assistant, working with the main printing machine. Some workers have a secondary job inside or outside the printing house. In order to compensate their scanty wages, the photo-set operator Viktory also works as a sweeper in the garden of the printing house, the pressman Maksim works as a cleaner after his work as a pressman, and the machinist Olga sometimes works as a cleaner in a heating supply company. These secondary jobs obviously distract their attention from their primary jobs. In short, many workers, particularly core (kadrovye) workers still
tend to display devotion to work, but when their status diminishes, rather than being inspired to organise a collective protest, their individual attachments to work and the collective (kollektiv) are shaken by a feeling of instability.

THE TRAP OF INSECURITY AND CLOSED-NESS

The insecurity of individual jobs may be rather trifling in comparison with the more formidable, if latent, threat of job loss as a whole. Workers feel any major change foreseeable in the printing house may bring about a massive lay-off or the entire closure of the company because of its fragile financial standing and the presence of a formidable competitor. Apart from old workers who remember the lay-off in 1996-97, newcomers are generally those who have experienced for themselves the bitter taste of redundancy in other workplaces. Aleksei once told me that, should the company be private, it would pay workers more than at present because part of the company’s profit now went to the state. However, when the rumour of privatization passed around during my re-visit in 2003, virtually all employees, including Aleksei and the managers, were scared by the possibility of the closure of the company or another massive lay-off. In 2002 the photoset operator in the book and journal shop, Losha said, “The newspaper shop is strategic. They print state-owned newspapers. I don’t think the workshop is going to be privatized. Anyway, they are safe. But we are different. People in our shop are worried about lay-off.” In 2003 people in the newspaper shop were in reality also frightened about lay-off. One of the probable scenarios they imagined was that after the printing house was passed on to a private hand the new owner would close down the whole workshop to set up a shopping mall on the site. This is because a printing house with obsolete equipment is not competitive and profitable at all, and people have seen the site of former factories converted into a market place many times in the last decade.

The closedown of the company is a more worrying possibility for those whose family members are working together there. In the Soviet era it was not rare for members of the same family to work in the same place, since one often inherited one’s parent’s job as a ‘family tradition,’ or one met one’s partner in the same workplace. When a female economist started her career in the Irkutsk Printing House in the 1980s, her father was still a shop chief. The veteran pressman Boris met his wife in the same workshop, the foreman Valerii’s wife has worked as a secretary to the Director, and Pasha took his son as a driver to the printing house in the early 90s, to cite a few examples. However, the tendency of working together with family or relatives is now further reinforced. Instead of the development of an open labor market, the newly introduced market economy has added force to the pre-established tendency of the use of personal networks. Yuri, the ex-foreman in the other factory, came to the newspaper shop to become an assistant pressman through his wife who packed newspapers. The whole family of Georgii, the apprentice of the newspaper shop,
except for his schoolgirl sister, work in the printing house. His parents worked
together to train dogs for the Special Police Unit (Alpha), after they had been
made redundant from a train carriage repair factory. After his mother got a job
in the printing house, his father followed her to become a trolley operator and
then Georgii joined in. Nine out of eleven packing workers are from a same
village, even if they are not relatives, and every time they need a worker they
invite their neighbour.

I have no exact figure as to how many employees are of the same family, but
my guess is that approximately half of the labor force is related to someone
else in the printing house. That the printing house has never failed to pay wages
on time seems to gain a point for job seekers, together with the fact that there
are few manufacturing jobs available in the city. It seems that this tendency of
getting a job through a kinship tie or an acquaintance has been on the increase
across Russia. The prestigious aviation factory in Irkutsk is said to accept only
a person whose relative or family has already worked there. The Director of
NovTekh told me that while about nine hundred people were on the job waiting
list, those whose family has already worked for the company were given the
priority of employment. David Griffith has observed the use of kinship and in-
formal social relations to recruit and organise labor in the North Carolina sea-
food processing industry and alien farm labor. He remarks, “Rather than rely
on market mechanisms, employers of small labor forces recognize the potential
that exists within the labor force for labor control: traditional authority resting
in the family and community” (Griffith 1987, 849). Perhaps this can also ex-
plain part of why the employers of post-Soviet Russia prefer to hire through
family and kinship networks. 7

Because obtaining respected job skill increased a worker’s status significantly,
in the past some workers tried to become one of the core (kadrovye) workers.
The opportunity for this was very random, though. When the pressman Yuri
came to the printing house, the enterprise was urgently in need of a pressman in
the newspaper shop and he became a pressman without any additional effort. In
contrast, Maksim had to start with the job of a trolley operator, and a few years
later he volunteered for becoming a pressman assistant when there was a va-
cancy. After having spent six years working as an assistant, he finally became a
pressman when the veteran pressman Boris retired in 2002. Workers often had
to use a patronage relation to get a prestigious job such as a pressman or a pho-
toset operator in the newspaper shop. Things have now changed. Since press-
men in the newspaper shop work at night and assistant pressmen are badly paid
for a long time before becoming a senior pressman, many young novices con-

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7 Simon Clarke has also observed that the use of personal connections has dramatically increased in
post-Soviet labor recruitment. He remarks: “They [shop chiefs] want somebody who has the required
technical skills to do the job, but also someone who will fit into the collective, who will be a commit-
ted worker and, often above all else, who will be loyal to the shop chief, both in his position as line
manager and personally” (Clarke 1999, 130). Therefore, “In prosperous enterprises most positions are
immediately filled by relatives and acquaintances of existing employees, so that the enterprise be-
comes a more closed system” (Clarke 1999,130-131).
continue to come and leave. The pressman Yuri told me, “In a year, I’ve seen five of my assistants come and go.” Yet the position of a pressman in the newspaper shop is presently one of the few prestigious job left open. The other prestigious positions are the photoset operator in the newspaper shop, and the main pressman in the book and journal shop. But these positions are virtually impossible to get because the main pressman is still very young and a foreman wants to become a photoset operator if somebody retires. As a whole, in the printing house, upward mobility and job shifting between workshops among manual workers, are getting clogged.

Blocked access to the prestigious jobs in the printing house is primarily due to the fact that the general decline in production and the abolition of many jobs have swept away such opportunities. However, that those with the prestigious jobs tend to stay, often even after the retirement, is another reason. Workers such as pressmen or photoset operators in the newspaper shop proudly say, “My job is rare.” This rarity of the job, previously the source of a strong leverage over negotiation with managers, has indeed become an issue; outside the printing house there is almost no interchangeable job with a decent wage for them. They are trapped by the ‘specificity of job’. This holds true of many workers, ranging from all pressmen and photoset operators to binders and typesetters. For more than a decade, the drastic downturn in the manufacturing industry as a whole has incurred the overall exodus of workers from the industry and limited opportunities to train workers. With the economic recovery of recent years, some analysts now predict the increasing demand for skilled workers (‘Na Kogo Budet Spros’ Chto Pochem 4 July 2002: 7). In 2002, experienced welders and mechanics were already in demand in the Irkutsk region, and the Shelekhov Machine-Repair Factory was often recruiting welders. However, many jobs in the printing house are too specific to be used elsewhere, or one’s job is deemed to be unskilled.

As a consequence, apart from transient newcomers, many workers have stayed with familiar co-workers and managers in the same workshop particularly since 1997-98. When I asked workers if there had been any change in the collective, the usual answer was, “There is no change at all. We have worked together all the time. The same people.” Workers often say that after the lay-off people in the same section got closer than before and stuck more to each other. The same workers, however, who have said this, also deplore that people in the collective have retreated into their personal lives. This is an apparently contradictory process in which people feel more attached to the collective and at the same time the collective does not fulfill people’s desire for social relatedness or unity. Everyday contact in the workplace is made up of the interactions with all

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8 Unlike during my fieldwork in 2002 when I observed a constant influx and exodus of pressman assistants, I found all assistant pressmen stayed in place in September 2003. Pressmen assistants were usually young and they tended to look out for better job opportunities, but now remaining assistant pressmen are relatively older with experiences of redundancy in other workplaces.

9 This is simply because the foreman’s wage is lower than photoset operators’.
the same faces whose number has been significantly reduced and who look ever more intimate. The employees, including managers, as a whole feel insecure about their job and thereby sense that they are in the same boat. The sameness and closed-ness often masks the undercurrent of changes, one of which will be underlined in the subsequent section: the relationship between line managers and workers.

**SEPARATION WITHIN THE WORKERS: THE CASE OF FEMALE WORKERS AND LINE MANAGERS**

As already mentioned, the workers do not take any collective action against bewilderingly raised status of managers and their diminished wages and social benefits. Instead, they try to hold on to their own job as far as it is available, and try to close the door of the enterprise against strangers, while they are anxious about the probable closedown of the enterprise near in the future. The survival strategy of the workers is individualistic in a double sense: they are not attentive to their co-workers’ mishaps including their lay-off; at the same time they distinguish themselves with others having different kinds of profession and jobs outside their workplace. One of the main borderlines between the workers, operating as an obstacle to the unity as a working class, is the distinction of male and female.

It is widely reported that the status of women in the post-socialist context has been lowered and women have become one of the first victims of redundancy or demotion (Ashwin 2000; Bowers 1996; Bridger et al. 1996; Monousova 1996). In case of the Irkutsk Printing House, however, at first glance, there has been seemingly no sign of additional discrimination against women. No woman worker has complained that somebody had been made redundant because she was a woman. No woman worker has been demoted from a machinist to, say, a sweeper, because of her gender. Those who would be dismissed, promoted and demoted would be selected generally through the criteria of work discipline and skills, the necessity of organising production and personal connections. Yet production itself was already organised around gendered notions of labor, so while women have not been particularly more victimised by dismissal, they have become more vulnerable to the shrinking of wages and the demoted job status. In the newspaper shop, the prestigious positions of pressmen and photo-set operators have always been filled with men because the labor process of the latter used to be harmful and the labor process of the former is said to require physical strength.10 Packing workers are always women because, they say, the work is less involved with physical strength and thereby considered to be light. The dispatching section is also filled with women, although nowadays sons of

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10 According to the labor code, women have been prohibited from night work, but that is not a pretext for the gender division of labor in this case. Many women workers in the newspaper shop have illegally worked at night since the Soviet era.
women workers sometimes join as a part-timer in the section. Thus the process of the lay-off was to choose those less fit within the category of a same gender. The same seems to be largely true of the book and journal shop, although things are a bit more complicated. Except for the binding section which is known as “women’s place,” men and women work together in a same section. Nevertheless, within the gender-mixed section, a specific job is allocated based upon gendered judgement. For example, the job of film editors and photoset operators now sometimes overlaps, but at the time of the lay-off the job of a photoset operator included the handling of noxious chemicals and was considered a “man’s job.” Although all working with small printing machines are now women (except for Aleksei who worked on a different type of printing machine before the lay-off), the main pressman working on the large printing machine had come to the printing house only four years ago and is, as usual, a man. I asked around why the man had taken the position of the main pressman instead of many presswomen who had worked for a long time. Somebody answered that was because he had higher education, others said that a woman could not handle such a large machine. (The main printing machine is approximately five meters long and two meters and a half high, whereas printing machines women work on are far smaller than this.) Unsatisfied with the answer, I asked a presswoman working on a small machine. She answered, the main pressman sometimes needs to exert physical strength and she cannot carry heavy things. However, even if it is physically hard or harmful especially for women, it seems possible for women to carry out these jobs with the aid of machines or assistant workers. After all, one of the main pressman assistants is a woman. Women workers in the binding section also move stacks of papers by cart, while a male cart operator is busy and away doing other jobs. Yet the gender stereotyping is never questioned by anybody and is accepted as the ‘natural’ order of things. As a consequence, although women are excluded from high-paid, prestigious jobs among manual workers and thereby victimised by the increasing gap of differential treatments, their mishaps do not appear to be outstanding but to be part of the doomed fate of low-skilled workers as a whole. As Simon Clarke observes, “it appears that women workers are disproportionately bearing the initial brunt of the economic crisis, both at home and at work. Yet most Russians, men and women, including social scientists, will insist that there is little or no discrimination against women in Russia, and that women’s disadvantage has nothing to do with their gender” (Clarke 1996, 15). Otherwise, the explanation given by both male and female workers is that women are con-

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11 In Bowers’ research about gender stereotypes in two printing enterprises in Syktyvkar, Russia, she has observed that both are known as ‘women’s enterprises’ but that most of jobs women are carrying out are regarded as men’s jobs. “For example, as one woman said, ‘much heavy work in Russia is done by women but it is still men’s work’” (Bowers 1996, 200). The Irkutsk Printing House is not known as women’s enterprise, but similar to her observation, most of the jobs in the printing house are regarded as men’s.
centrated in relatively less prestigious jobs because they are less ambitious (women’s primary concern is to care for children and family at home).

In spite of the lack of recognition of a gendered division of labor, some women workers suffered more in dismissal. Olga in the binding section took maternity leave in the early 1990s before the lay-off. She was told by the female shop chief not to apply for the legitimate leave of three years because the company might not afford to arrange a place for her when she came back. Nevertheless, she exerted the legal right to have maternal leave; after having rested for some months at home, she worked for a kindergarten for two years while at the same time receiving pay from the printing house. On her return to the printing house which then was about to start the lay-off, she found her place taken up by the other woman. She argued with the shop chief, “Who is most fit with the machine? She, or me?” The shop chief conceded that Olga was a more experienced and skilled machinist than the other woman, so Olga managed to secure her job and the other woman was sacked. I did not have many opportunities to investigate women workers’ particular disadvantages in the lay-off and after, but even in this episode the competition for a job appeared between two women not between man and woman, as Olga recounted to me.

In the Irkutsk Printing House, the two shop chiefs are women and many senior managers, including the Vice-Director, are women. Whereas I have never heard anybody complaining about their gender, some workers have expressed doubts about a female shop chief. I asked the pressman Oleg, whose wife is a forewoman in the binding section, about the woman shop chief in the newspaper shop who replaced a male shop chief during the lay-off in 1996-97.

YH: What do you think of your shop chief?
Oleg: Oh! In principle, women should not work, particularly in our workshop.
YH: Why?
Oleg: This is masculine production here. Look! We are all men. As a manager (nachal’nik), you have to speak in mat.¹² You have to be tough. You have to scold people. I know a woman shop chief [a former shop chief before the male one]. She speaks mat and is tough. But she is like a man, not like a woman. Again, our shop chief is now a woman. If I have a problem, I can’t speak straight away with shop chief.
YH: But on the third floor, women are working.
Oleg: As a rule, women shouldn’t work, but in Russia women do hard work, and men don’t work.

In his account, it is a pity that women in general work with men, female managers (nachal’nik) in particular because the women risk their femaleness in or-

¹² Mat is the swearing sub-language of Russian.
der to work properly. From the workers’ point of view, the job of line manager is particularly regarded as male because it used to — and to a certain degree still does now — require a tough character. The administration jobs, however, such as economist, accountant and so on are suitable for women if they have to work (but the Director should be a man or at least a man-like woman). The former shop chief Tatyana recalled the difficulties of dealing with men workers during her early days in the printing house.

I started working here in 1962 at the age of twenty two just after the institute. All my family were engaged in the printing industry [In reality, many of her relatives were journalists but somehow journalists are related to the printing industry], and so was I. From the very beginning, I worked as a shop chief. Then people here were all young. I was pretty and all people liked me. [Then the pressman Boris interrupted, “It’s because I could speak to her in mat. Other managers didn’t take mat, but she was different.”] I also spoke to them in mat. Then we were one hundred twenty. In the beginning, I cried every night. I didn’t want to become a shop chief (nachal’nik). I was so young and there were many old workers. I was scared… Today I banned drinking, but tomorrow I had to close my eyes. Drinking was dangerous. They could have their fingers cut by the printing cylinder. Sometimes foremen came to work drunk. It was horrible. Sometimes people didn’t come to work. But we should hold on to people. We were short of people. We couldn’t replace people.

In the past, without real levers of managerial power, the line managers were charged with controlling workers’ work discipline and production, and the process of controlling often involved with scolding, threatening and negotiation, all qualities of which are considered as male. Mandel’s interview with a foreman working for an automobile company also reveals how difficult it was for the line manager to carry out their job.

Basically they’ll tell the foreman, “My television is on blink, and I called the repairman. He said he’d come sometime during the day.” Or else the mother-in-law has come, or he has to drive his wife to see her mother or has to get his children at the station. The foreman will say, “Okay, go and I’ll put down that you worked today.” Such are the relations. The foreman lets you go, and when there is work at night or a day off to be worked, you help him out. A worker understands it isn’t the foreman’s fault — the administration is forcing him. If the foreman doesn’t succeed in convincing the worker, the senior foreman comes, then the party organizer, then the department head. One guy, Serezha told me
how he refused and then the head of the personnel department came down and even climbed into the body and embraced him, trying to get him to come out to work… Yes. It’s illegal to force someone to work overtime. The workers really don’t threaten directly, but the foreman knows that if he pushes certain workers too far, they won’t come out. He has to calculate all this when he’s deciding whether to punish someone for a violation of discipline (Mandel 1994, 57-58).

Line managers such as a shop chief and fore(wo)man were under double pressure—“from the side of the administration of the enterprise came the strict requirement to fulfil the plan and maintain discipline, without having been supplied with sufficient levers of management, while from the side of ordinary workers, seeking to resolve their problems through a special kind of blackmail, came the threat of leaving for another enterprise” (Romanov 1996, 174). Their difficult position was well recognised and often appreciated by ordinary workers, while being taken advantage of by them. In general, fore(wo)men have been regarded as closer to the side of workers than to that of management, shop chiefs belonging to management (cf. Ilyn and Ilyina 1996).

However, workers now often feel the power of shop management threateningly outgrowing. In the newspaper shop, there are still many core (kadrovye) workers who are considered to be irreplaceable to sustain production, and the new shop chief does not know the actual labor process enough to interfere in everyday matters, so the relation between the shop management and workers appears to be the same as before. The discontents of the workers in the newspaper shop are generally about the Director. In contrast, in the book and journal shop, whose profit is not sufficient to pay the employed, things are different. The profit made by the newspaper shop is transferred to sustain the book and journal shop, and many workers move from one job to the other. They make a living through the managers’ ‘generous’ supplementing money to their wages and random job allocation. In return, the shop chief exerts her full authority and power, as workers have become like hostages of management. There is one woman worker in the binding section who always works on a profitable job. I asked Olga why this woman always does the same profitable job.

Olga: This is because she has a special kind of relationship with the forewoman. We call the job blatnaya [obtainable through blat].

YH: What about in the past?

Olga: The same. In the past, they did it in secret, but now they do it openly. You know, Ivanovna [the forewoman] does work on her own, and her work is always contributed to Sveta’s wage. I don’t know why, but she does it.
In the book and journal shop, the forewoman is now considered to be more empowered than before, in contrast with the newspaper shop where a foreman is willing to take the profitable job of a photoset operator, when and if possible. In general workers feel their status declined and their pride damaged by the current changes; but as the degree of the decline and damage differs from one workshop to the other, and from a skilled worker to an unskilled worker, so does the relation between shop management and workers. A worker in one workshop does not know and does not pay attention to what is happening to the other workshop. Some workers deplored the weakness of the working class in Russia and emphasised the necessity of solidarity of the working mass, but the same workers took it for granted that packing workers would have small wages and, belittled their light work. This obstinate, differentiated status and value of labor among manual workers, which may be seen as an obstacle for class formation, stems from the Soviet version of the nineteenth century episteme about production and labor.  

SEPARATION BETWEEN THE WORKERS: PRODUCTIVE AND NON-PRODUCTIVE WORK

Many workers despise those engaged in trading, advertising, banking and the like, whom they consider do not make a direct contribution to production. The pressman Mikhail said, “Actually, I can’t approve of people like managers. I know these young people are paid 7,000 or 8,000 roubles a month. But I can’t accept those, who work for advertisement, trading or financing.” (Do you think production is more important?) “Yes. If people are all engaged in advertisement or model agency, who makes the things we need? We all like to eat. But who makes food? Of course, every profession is needed. We need them all. But you have to make something first, then you can trade and advertise.” The former Party secretary, Pasha told me when he had come across a former Party cadre on a bus one day he had challenged him, “How can you work for a bank? You were a Communist!” The pressman assistant Sasha recounted to me how horrible it had been for him when he had had to sell some household stuff on street during the harsh period of the mid 1990s. He exclaimed, “I can’t do it again! Never again!” I asked Sasha who in the newspaper shop he thought could do selling, and he mentioned the names of some people, all of whom he

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13 It should be noted that the nineteenth century episteme does not refer to a specific historical stage that will be replaced by the other. Rather, this term defines basic notions that make possible social practices and discourse in general up to this day, although it has been recently tottering.  
14 Despise of traders and the emphasis on “productive” labor seems to be widespread in post-socialist countries, although in some countries and regions these notions may be on the wane. See Humphrey (1999) for Russia, Stewart (1993) for Hungary, and Kaneff (2002) for Bulgaria.  
15 He used the term manegzher, coming from the English word manager, not the Russian equivalent nachal’nik. In this context, he refers to so-called young managers in the service sector, not managers in conventional enterprises.
did not like. The foreman Valerii expressed his contempt for traders unreservedly.

I hate them. I respect those who work at the dacha. I can shake hands with them. I relate well with them. But those who make a profit margin are a problem. They don’t labor. They buy here at a low rate and sell there at a high rate. They live on our labor! They themselves don’t labor. The salespeople are badly paid. One thousand roubles and a half. They of course cheat us by thirty percent so that they take the money home [despite their scanty wages]. The owners are all from Caucasus.

In his account, he distinguishes two kinds of traders—salespeople and owners, and the reasons for his hatred of them are different: salespeople cheat and owners make profit without laboring. In other words, in so far as salespeople earn a living through laboring and are honest, they are acceptable; but their income should not be higher than that of workers who make useful things. This logic is the very extension of differentiating workers’ labor in the workplace. The more directly is one’s job related to production, the better should one be treated. The pressmen and photoset operators are the most respected people not only because the work skills are hard to obtain but also because their job has a direct bearing on the final products. The shop management makes a direct contribution to production through supervising and professional knowledge so that their job should be respected. However, office workers who “just calculate” do not have any reason to be better paid, although their jobs are also indispensable. By the same token, the job of sweepers, packing workers and the like is indispensable, but their contribution to production is insignificant so that their pay should correspond to their tiny contribution. As far as one is a worker, his value as a worker is differentiated and should be so. In this way, workers or the working class is not homogeneous but differentiated.

In the meantime, production is involved with what lies beyond ordinary workers’ perception and knowledge—number and connections. Managerial decisions are made based upon numerical calculations, through plan in the past and profit in the present-day. The “objective” appearance of numbers has the power to persuade people to believe the legitimacy of managerial decisions by the Director.16 That the book and journal shop does not make enough profit to sustain itself is proved by figures, and nobody dares to challenge the power of the numbers and thereby the relative level of the wages. Workers always speculate about the financial situation of the company and are hungry for information.

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16 See Rose (1999, 197-233) for the power of numbers in shaping the modern subject and politics.
However, even if they get by some information, the authoritative interpretation is finally done by management, by the Director in particular who knows all of the figures and their implications. Workers are looking forward to the introduction of new printing machines, but only the Director is eligible to make a decision. The power of numbers is fortified when it is combined with connections. Workers often complain about the Director, but are not certain if a new director will have better connections with Moscow, as well as local business, to take more work orders and money. Whoever assumes the directorate, the workers are helpless about some crucial elements which constitute production. As the Director is situated at the heart of the imperceptible and unreachable, he should be differentially treated regardless of social upheavals such as the collapse of a commanding economy.

**CONCLUSION**

Since the introduction of a market economy, the logic of Soviet production has been transformed and workers are now forced to face the heightened status of managers and specialists. However it does not seem that the differentiated evaluation of labor by manufacturing workers is largely giving way to another moral of value. Workers themselves are more fragmented than before, but in accordance to the hierarchical order originating from the old Soviet production regime. They are often paid more differentially than before, in accordance to the new logic of a market economy. Many workers deplore that the new way of appreciating one’s value in monetary term is not “fair and just.” In most factories which can’t stand up on their feet, there are scare resources to hush the workers’ complaints about increasing inequality. Nevertheless the differential treatment of the workers is itself taken for granted by them; those with dispensable job such as sweeper, porter or trolley operator may be sacked from the enterprise if necessary.

At the same time, the logic of the market does not exclude itself the image of the differentiation of labor-power, but imposes its own appraisal method of different labor-power, quite different from that of planned economy. Thus even if the logic of the market prevails, the homogenisation of workers does not happen automatically. Moreover, what we are witnessing in the Russian enterprise is the emergence of the hybrid of conventional values and new imports resulting from economic reform, rather than a pure logic of the market that does not exist anywhere.

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17 In practice, the introduction of modern machines is an important but tricky decision. Concerning a printing house in Komi, Russia, Yaroshenko (m.s.) reports that the purchase of up-to-date, expensive machines brought about a serious financial problems because the reception of work order was not sufficient to pay back the loan and its interest.
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**РЕЗЮМЕ**

Данная статья опровергает общепризнанную теорию о том, что общественная система в Советском Союзе ориентирована в основном на равноправие. В то же время автор статьи утверждает, что в его производственной системе были присущими определённые ранги и иерархии, что такой порядок был признан и рабочим и руководящим. Разумеется, что логика советского производства отличается от логики капиталистического. А в соответствии с теорией трудовой стоимости К. Маркса, переведённой Властью, стоимость трудовой силы оценивалась неравноправно. Если в капиталистическом обществе стоимость трудовой силы оценивается рынком, в Союзе она подвергалась оценку государством и по этой оценке неравно оплачивались зарплата и обхождение трудовым людям. После внедрения капитализма углубление неравноправия и разницы в оплате труда вызывали большое недовольство среди трудовых людей. Но они не поднимали вопрос по поводу самого неравного обращения, которое продолжалось после советского периода. Тем самым трудовые люди не столько сотрудничают друг с другом под единственною идентификацией, сколько ограничиваются лишь личным откликом против сокращения оплаты и увольнения.
KEY WORDS: Soviet production, inequality, workers, market economy, Foucault

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: Советское производство, неравенство, рабочий класс, рыночная экономика, труд