

- Received: 30 June 2008
- Revised: 15 October 2008
- Accepted: 1 November 2008

**FROM BELLIGERENT
TO MULTI-ETHNIC DEMOCRACY:
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN UNRECOGNIZED STATES
AFTER THE CEASEFIRES**

Kimitaka Matsuzato

Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University, Kita 9, Nishi 7, Kita-ku, Sapporo
060-0809, Japan

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia generated a number of unrecognized states. While the international community forcibly liquidated those having emerged in the former Yugoslavia, four unrecognized states in the former Soviet Union – the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), Abkhazia, Transnistria or the Pridnestr Moldovan Republic (PMR), and South Ossetia – have survived to this day. As an unexpected result of the military conflict in August 2008, two of them – South Ossetia and Abkhazia – received their long-awaited recognition by Russia.

The armed conflict around South Ossetia in August 2008 revived public interest in unrecognized states. It is, to an extent, understandable that researchers have paid much more attention to international aspects of the issue than to its domestic implications. Yet several researches have focused on the domestic politics of these states, a harbinger of which was Charles King (2001).¹ Although their studies would seem to be more balanced, empirical, less politicized than those focused on international aspects of the issue, their admirable attempts to compare the domestic politics of unrecognized states appear sketchy. This essay tries to elucidate the logic of political development in the NKR, Abkhazia, and the PMR after the ceasefires.²

¹ See, for example, Kolstø & Melgin (1998), Roper (2004 and 2006), Mihalkanin (2004), Skakov (2005), Kolstø (2006), Маркедонов (2006a, b, c), Kolstø & Blakkisrud (2008), and Clogg (2008). Although focused on international relations, Dov Lynch's book (2004) includes observations of the domestic politics of the unrecognized states.

² This essay does not analyze South Ossetia since I have not conducted fieldwork there.

I identify this logic of development as follows. The painful civil wars, from which the unrecognized states were born, left strong social and psychological aftereffects. On the one hand, these wars were crystallized in the people's mind as an experience of a primitive, belligerent democracy. This is not to say, for example, that the Abkhazian government during its evacuation to Gudauta (when Sukhum was occupied by Georgian troops) was morally pure and solely based on popular self-sacrifice. As is the case with any war, perhaps, admirable heroism and self-sacrifice coexisted with atrocities, nepotism, and economic speculation. What I appreciate here is the fact that the population remembers the war as a time of primordial justice, constant references to which proved to be indispensable in the making (remaking) of post-war democracy. This might also be common for any large-scale war in history.³ With this qualification, I call the de facto democracy during the wars "belligerent democracy."

On the other hand, however, the addiction to wartime heroism made it difficult for the populations to adapt themselves to normal civil democracy and a market economy freed from state capitalism in hostilities. They could hardly understand that braveness in battlefield was one thing, but civilian courageousness necessary for democracy was another. Moreover, after a decade of politicized season, civil war, and blockade, people became tired. They preferred to delegate power to heroes of the independence war, such as Samvel Babayan, Vladislav Ardzinba, and Igor Smirnov. Cronies and relatives of these leaders exploited this situation, concentrated wealth and power in their hands, while the founding fathers of the states fell from power one by one. When negative tendencies went beyond a threshold, a new massive mobilization for redemocratization took place.

The more total and cruel the war was, the stronger and more harmful its aftereffects became. This implies, on the other hand, that the threshold from patience to protest of the population might be lowered, if the aftereffects were more harmful. Since the Karabakh War was most total among the three civil wars, its aftereffects were extremely significant, generating something akin to a "federation of field commanders" in Chechnya (Маркедонов 2006a, 14); the former commanders monopolized the politics and economies of the NKR. Because of this indisputable evil, however, a change of the ruling group came earlier in the NKR, in 1999-2000, than in Transnistria and Abkhazia. The hostilities and victims were relatively limited in Transnistria, which therefore did not suffer from Karabakh-style militarism, though inertia of the war, all the same, prevented the PMR from shifting to a market economy. Partly because of this limited harm of the war's aftereffects, the PMR has remained the only unrecognized state that continues to be ruled by the leader since the early 1990s, Igor Smirnov. Abkhazia lies between Karabakh and Transnistria in terms of war aftermath. In this republic, the change of government took place in 2004.⁴

When the opposition tried to protest against negative phenomena in the post-war period, they largely had two options of appealing to the population. The first was the recovery of the founding ideals of the state, return to belligerent democracy. Since the aftereffects of the war were most significant in Karabakh, this discourse of "return" emerged there most

³ Summarizing the political consequences of warfare in modern French history, Daniel Moran maintains: "The *levée en masse* of 1793 was a historical event with significant consequences and a source for one of the most powerful organizing myths of modern politics: that compulsory, mass social mobilizations merely express, and give effective form to, the wishes or higher values of the community and its members" (Moran 2003, 3).

⁴ The differing aftermaths of the wars determined the scale of these republics' armed forces. According to Charles King (2001, 535), the armed forces consisted of 15,000 to 20,000 men (a military man per 6.9 to 9.2 population) in Karabakh, 5,000 in Abkhazia (a military man per 50 population), and 5,000 to 10,000 (a military man per 55.5 to 111 population) in Transnistria in 2000-2001.

typically. Both supporters of and protestors against the former commanders' "dictatorship" came from the veterans of the Karabakh War. The protestors raised the slogan: "Don't surrender the freedom acquired at the cost of blood." It was not by chance that the oppositions in the NKR and Abkhazia named their parties by the concept of "return" or "recovery": Movement-88 in the NKR and Aitaira (Rebirth) in Abkhazia, whereas in the PMR, the opposition named itself *Obnovlenie* (Innovation).

The slogans for return to belligerent democracy proved to be effective only temporarily. After realizing the Bagapsh administration in 2004, Aitaira in Abkhazia, as a public organization, faded out.⁵ Having achieved impressive success in the local elections in the NKR in 2004, a result of which Movement-88 gained the mayoralty of the state capital of Stepanakert (note that the NKR is the only state in South Caucasus, be it *de jure* or *de facto*, in which the mayor of the state capital is elected, but not appointed by the president), this party was completely defeated in the parliamentary elections in 2005 and practically split on the eve of the presidential elections in 2007.

The second option for redemocratization, appealing for multinationalism, proved to be more enduring than the attempts to return to belligerent democracy, though the mono-ethnic NKR cannot adopt this strategy. Having benefited more than the others from the idea of returning to belligerent democracy, the NKR lacks the conditions for multi-ethnic state building, since the harshness of the Karabakh War did not leave the non-Armenian population in its territory. Up to a certain moment, Karabakh leaders even tried to persuade the Azerbaijanis not to leave the republic if they were ready to be obedient citizens of the Armenian Karabakh state, let alone other traditional populations, such as the Greeks and Russians, for whom various privileges were promised. All these measures failed and 95 percent of the present NKR population is Armenian, which creates tremendous predicaments not only for its international recognition, but also state building.⁶

The PMR has the longest, most consistent tradition of multi-ethnic state building. Previous studies have admitted that the Transnistrian conflict was not ethnic based, but one caused by "politicized regionalism" (Kolstø and Malgin. 1998; Roper 2004). The PMR did not create IDPs (internally displaced persons), in contrast to the NKR and Abkhazia. From the very beginning of the separation movement, Transnistrian leaders endeavored to distinguish left-bank Moldovans from their compatriots on the right bank. In right-bank Moldova during the late 1980s and early 1990s, rampant pan-Romanian nationalism resulted in the denial of the very existence of the Moldovan nation and language. Therefore, it was not difficult for Transnistrian leaders to describe the newly born polity as the last bastion of not only the Russophone and Ukrainophone populations, but also Moldovans. When the left-bank Moldovans participated in the armed resistance against Moldovan troops, in solidarity with ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, the result of the civil war was predetermined.

⁵ One of the former leaders of Aitaira, Oleg Damenia, explained that they did not pursue long-term political purposes, but only tried to prove that it was possible to change the government in a legal way (interview in Sukhum on 22 August 2006).

⁶ Laurence Broers describes this situation as follows: "This [ethnic homogenization of Nagorny Karabakh through the deportation of the Azeri population] removed a key political cleavage, enabling a certain core consensus on the existence and purpose of the resulting *de facto* state. However, it has also closed off a potential avenue for the articulation of a civic rather than ethnic sense of membership; although multiethnic Abkhazia has yet to reap genuine democratic dividends from incorporating minorities, their existence in itself creates political space for competing visions of Abkhazian statehood. In Karabakh ethnic homogenization has shut off debates on the nature of political membership and underpinned the effacement of a Karabakh Azeri identity" (Broers 2005).

In 1998, the Abkhazian authorities began to follow the Transnistrian scenario by calling the former Mingrelian population of Gal District, the southeast extreme of Abkhazia bordered with Georgia, to return from the refugee camps of Georgia to their native land. The next stage of the multinational state building in Abkhazia was the victory of Sergei Bagapsh, supported by the Gal Mingrelians, in the presidential election in 2004. President Bagapsh continued this strategy to win the parliamentary elections in 2007, by proposing to raise the portion of deputies with Armenian and Slavic origins.

Further, I argue against the influential view that the unrecognized states are puppets of Russia or Armenia and compare their economic potentials, international (dis)advantages, and institutional frameworks (presidencies and parliaments). After these preliminary steps, I examine the post-war histories of these states according to the scheme described here.

THE UNRECOGNIZED STATES – PUPPETS OF RUSSIA AND ARMENIA?

Researchers often regarded the NKR as a puppet of Armenia, the other three unrecognized states – of Russia.⁷ This *idée fixe* prevented them from analyzing the domestic politics of these polities as an independent variable. In fact, however, Russia's traditional policy towards frozen conflicts prior to 2004 had been to balance between the unrecognized states and their former suzerains. When the Russian government enjoyed amicable relations with Georgia and Moldova, it was ready to sacrifice the unrecognized states for friendship with them.⁸ It was only after the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine that Russia reconsidered this "balance" policy and began to support the unrecognized states more consistently.

In an interview with me, Aleksandr Voloshin, chief of Russia's presidential administration in 1999-2003, said that the international community misunderstood the relations between Russia and the unrecognized states: "If we advise the Abkhazians to surrender to the Georgians, we will just lose our influence in Abkhazia."⁹ Having spent two weeks in Abkhazia in 2006, I do not regard this statement as an excuse. On the other hand, Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, an important policy maker in Georgia's foreign affairs, says that the Russians suggest that the Georgians "find a common language with the Abkhazians," but on the other hand, encourage the Abkhazians not to compromise with the Georgians, promising their aid to the Abkhazians.¹⁰ I find this explanation plausible too, but Rondeli does not say that Abkhazia is Russia's puppet.

The relations between the NKR and Armenia have not been simple, either. The Karabakh Armenians often regard themselves as a real representative of Armenian-ness, "purer" than

⁷ Dov Lynch is an ardent advocate of this interpretation (2004, 81-85). However, he confuses resource dependency with political dependence. In history, the most subsidized has often been the most defiant, as was the case with Russian regionalism in the 1990s. Moreover, the dependency of several *de jure* states in the former Soviet territories, such as Georgia and Moldova, on external support would seem to be much more significant than that of the unrecognized states.

⁸ In particular, Abkhazia supported Chechnya during the first Chechen War (1994-96) in return for Chechens' assistance to Abkhazia in its war with Georgia in 1992-93. Enraged by this behavior, Yeltsin, in tandem with Shevardnadze, blockaded Abkhazia during 1996-2001. Abkhazian people recollect this blockade as no less painful an event than the very war with Georgia.

⁹ My interview in Tokyo on 25 January 2008.

¹⁰ My interview in Tbilisi on 8 February 2008.

the mainland Armenians.¹¹ Apparently, this psychology is shared by the Galician Ukrainians and Kosovo Albanians. As is the case with the mainland Ukrainians and Albanians, the mainland Armenians are often irritated by the Karabakh Armenians' arrogant self-assertion. The NKR's tough position in conflict management often becomes a source of headache for Armenian leaders. Overall, it seems more appropriate to analyze the relations between the unrecognized states and their protectors as an example of trans-border features of domestic politics, characteristic of the contemporary world, rather than as a peculiarity usable to deny the need to analyze their domestic politics as an independent variable.

RANKING THE UNRECOGNIZED STATES: ECONOMIC POTENTIAL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AND INSTI- TUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS

Transnistria's population is the largest among the three, about 555,000 according to the 2004 Census, which followed by about 250,000 of Abkhazia. The NKR is the smallest among the three, with about 138,000 people according to the 2005 Census. Their economic potentials correspond to the demographic. Transnistria, along with the Urals and Left-bank Ukraine, used to be the most industrialized region of the USSR. Until the blockade of Transnistria by the EUBAM,¹² which started in March 2006, it exported steel and other products to the United States and Western Europe. Without developed manufacturing, Abkhazia relies upon tourism and commercial agriculture, releasing fruit, tea, and meat. Despite the time-consuming passage control on the border of the Psau River, the number of tourists from Russia has surmounted the prewar level.

However, accessibility to the world market upsets this rating by economic potential. The blockade revealed Transnistria's vulnerability; without exposure to the sea, this republic has been sandwiched by two hostile states (Moldova and Ukraine) after the Orange Revolution. After the blockade by Russia in the second half of the 1990s ended, Abkhazia regained access to the world via Russia under Putin. The NKR has the most stable connection with the world via Armenia; in this republic, problems with postal mail, international calls, and mobile phones are not suffered. The Armenian Diaspora invested a large sum of money for Karabakh's post-war recovery.¹³

What is more important is their influence on international media and public opinion. Here also, the NKR can count in the Diaspora's activities. Armenia receives tens of messages from US congressmen each year on April 24 (the anniversary of the Armenian geno-

¹¹ Georgy Petrosian, ex-speaker of the NKR parliament, and other Karabakh leaders often refer to nineteenth-century history, when mainland Armenia was incorporated into Yerevan Gubernia under the Russian Empire. In contrast, in Karabakh, small princedoms (*melikdoms*), run by local notables, remained to function. Melikdoms raised a spirit of aristocratic liberalism and sense of civil responsibility. This interesting but arguable interpretation of history ends up with a more problematic assertion that this is why mainland Armenia needed to recruit NKR president Robert Kocharian to Yerevan in 1997 to reinforce Armenia's statehood. My interview with G. Petrosian, adviser to the NKR president, in Stepanakert on 4 April 2005.

¹² The European Union Border Assistance Mission is an organization created in 2005 by the EU, Moldova, and Ukraine for the control of the PMR's Ukrainian border.

¹³ For example, the Diaspora's donations made it possible to build a highway from Goris (Armenian border) to Stepanakert under the international construction standard. Ten years after its completion, there are no holes or cleavages on this road. See various projects run by the Armenia Fund USA at: www.armeniafundusa.org/projects/north-south.htm

cide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915). To exploit this privilege, the NKR tries to evade one-sided reliance on Russia's assistance. For example, the NKR is only an observer of the parliamentary associations composed of the unrecognized states, while the other three are its full members.¹⁴ It is obvious that the NKR tries to gain international recognition by distinguishing itself from the other unrecognized states, not in solidarity with them (Маркедонов 2006b, 153).

All unrecognized states "voluntarily implemented a number of international standards applying to *de jure* states" (Broers 2005; see also Clogg 2008, 310-311) and tried hard to show themselves democratic and esteeming human rights. This is a minimal condition to evade their coercive liquidation, a scenario that unfolded in Yugoslavia. However, if Transnistria's understanding of democracy has a strong tint of a Soviet-style plebiscite,¹⁵ Karabakh tries to adopt the principles of ordinary liberal democracy. In an interview with me in 2005, the NKR president's assistant, David Babayan, said: "One girl (Azerbaijan) is from a rich family (has strategic and resource-producing attractiveness for the West), but her character is bad (undemocratic). Another girl (the NKR) is from a poor family (disadvantageous in geopolitics and resources), but she has a good character (democratic). If the girl from the poor family has a bad character, who wants to marry her?"¹⁶ I find this statement sincere, though the analogy is not very Western.

Partly because of the small scales of the countries, the unrecognized states have been reluctant to introduce typical semi-presidential systems and proportional elections for their parliaments. According to the constitution confirmed by the national referendum in December 1995, Transnistria is the only country among about thirty post-socialist states that chose full presidentialism. I have not researched the reasons for this peculiar choice, but currently, Russia interprets it as a mechanism to secure the monopoly of concessions in the republic by the Smirnov family. Russia requests Transnistria to shift to a semi-presidential system by introducing the office of prime minister. Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia adopted an "almost full presidential semi-presidential system" by the NKR Law on the President (December 1994) and the Abkhazian Constitution (November 1994). In this system, the office of prime minister exists, but the president appoints him personally; he does not need parliament's confirmation for the candidacy. Parliament only has the right to express no-confidence to the prime minister.¹⁷ This is a universal system for South Caucasus countries, both recognized and unrecognized. In contrast, other CIS countries adopted more typical semi-presidentialism, in which the president needs parliament's confirmation to appoint the prime minister (instead, the president may disband parliament in the case of repeated disobedience).

Abkhazia did not hurry to ratify this constitution by referendum and parliament appointed Vladislav Ardzinba (see below) as the first president, without holding popular elections. In other words, Abkhazia did not abandon the quest for reconfederation with Georgia, abstaining from referendum on constitution and presidential elections. This abstention was abandoned in 1999. The NKR needed to make a long journey together with its protector, Armenia. The NKR did not have a constitution until the referendum on December 10, 2006

¹⁴ This organization is named the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the States / Members of the Association "For Democracy and Rights of Peoples."

¹⁵ For example, the PMR often conducts referenda to legitimate its policies. What distinguishes the PMR from Belarus and Central Asia is that the leadership sometimes fails to mobilize the necessary vote, as was the case with the referendum on privatization of land in 2003 (Волкова 2005, Гл. 4).

¹⁶ My interview in Stepanakert on 14 April 2005.

¹⁷ On the "almost full presidential semi-presidentialism," see Matsuzato (2006). Robert Elgie names this system "highly presidentialized semi-presidentialism" in Elgie and Moestrup (2007, 10).

confirmed it. It was difficult for the NKR to deliberate a viable constitution without coordinating it with the Armenian constitution, but in Armenia itself, the legitimacy of the “presidentialized semi-presidential” constitution of 1995 was constantly challenged. The shift of Armenia to a semi-presidential regime, typical of the CIS, by constitutional amendment in November 2005 opened the way for the NKR to adopt a similar system.¹⁸ Thus, Armenia and the NKR have become exceptional countries in South Caucasus with a relatively strong parliament and limited president.

The NKR experienced three parliamentary elections (in 1992, 1995, and 2000), based on a purely single-mandate constituency system. In the parliamentary elections in June 2005, one third of the thirty-three deputies were elected through a proportional district, while in Armenia, 60 percent of deputies are elected in this way. The 1992 elections in Abkhazia were the last attempt to evade the civil war, assigning a quota to Georgian deputies. Since Georgian deputies escaped to Georgia in 1993 and established an émigré parliament, a “rump parliament” governed Abkhazia in 1993-1996. Independent Abkhazia conducted three parliamentary elections in 1996, 2002, and 2007, all of which were based on the majoritarian principle. All parliamentary elections conducted in the PMR, 1991, 1995, 2000, and 2005, were based on a single-mandate constituency system.

STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE FORMER FIELD COMMANDERS AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN THE NKR¹⁹

Before the adoption of the Law on the President in 1995, the NKR had a purely parliamentary regime. However, in 1992, when almost half of the Karabakh territory was occupied by Azerbaijan troops, the Supreme Soviet (parliament) delegated a significant part of its authorities to the State Committee of Defense (SCD) chaired by Robert Kocharian, the future Karabakh, and later Armenian, president. After the ceasefire on May 12, 1994, the SCD was abolished and parliament adopted the Law on the President in December 1994. Considering the difficult socio-economic situation after the war, the law authorized parliament to appoint the first president without holding popular elections and, through this procedure, Robert Kocharian filled the post. The first presidential election was held on November 24, 1996, in which Kocharian overwhelmed two other candidates, gaining 88.9 percent of the vote. In March 1997, Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian recruited Kocharian as Armenia’s prime minister. The vacancy was filled by Arkadii Gukasian, a former military journalist, as a result of the presidential election on September 1, 1997. He gained 89.3 percent of the vote (НК Республика: hereafter, НКР. 5 September 1997) and served as president for two terms until 2007.

Adaptation to post-war normalcy proved to be more difficult for the victors than for the defeated. After the ceasefire in 1994, demobilized soldiers of the NKR requested a guarantee of their employment and income, which their former commanders regarded as their own duty and, thus, preserve the clientelistic networks formed during the war. This “social capital” functioned as a vehicle to influence the civilian authorities. Moreover, those who led the NKR and Armenia to victory were neither professional militaries, such as Charles de Gaulle and Dwight D. Eisenhower, nor revolutionary intelligentsia, such as Fidel Castro, who studied law at Havana University, and Che Guevara, a graduate of the medical faculty

¹⁸ For an English translation of the NKR constitution: www.president.nkr.am/en/constitution/full-Text/

¹⁹ See details of Karabakh’s post-war history in Matsuzato (2007).

of Buenos Aires University. They were just partisans, composed of plain, uneducated, often very young people. Samvel Babayan, the greatest hero of the Karabakh War, worked at a car repair shop before the beginning of the Karabakh movement. Vazgen Sarkisian, the future prime minister of Armenia, was a teacher of physical exercises before he became an officer of the Soviet Army. Having become top leaders of the NKR and Armenia, they preferred to act as shady kingmakers, rather than becoming presidents, since the international reaction to such presidents was predictable. However, their protégés (R. Kocharian and A. Gukasian) overgrew to compete with them, which resulted in the unprecedented tragedies in the Armenian and Karabakh histories: the murder of the prime minister and the parliament speaker in the Armenian parliament building in October 1999 and the attempted assassination of the NKR president in March 2000.

Samvel Babayan participated in the Karabakh movement in 1988, when he was only twenty-four years old. In 1990, he created a partisan detachment. In summer 1992, when half of the NKR territory was under Azerbaijan's control, Babayan started to rally disorganized partisan groups into a regular army and became the youngest general in the former USSR. In 1993, the NKR government appointed him to the post of defense minister of the republic. Though formally the NKR parliament passed its authority to the SCD, the real power was vested in Babayan. When I interviewed him in December 2005, after he was released from prison (see below), he said that in history, no war was determined by force; war is a chess game, fought by intellect.²⁰

Being defense minister, he supported Kocharian in the 1996 presidential elections. Babayan himself was already extremely rich and began to protect the former commanders/businessmen. For this purpose, he began to intervene in civilian spheres of government, which had no relations with his ministry. For example, he tried to initiate the post-war restoration of Stepanakert, which provoked dissatisfaction of Prime Minister L. Petrosian. To resolve this "cabinet crisis" in June 1998, President Gukasian proposed parliament himself as the candidate for premier post and asked to amend the Law on the President to make this concurrence possible. However, only six out of the twenty-seven deputies supported this constitutional change, while sixteen voted against it (HKP. 12 June 1998). This implied not only the legal cautiousness of the deputies, but also Babayan's popularity at that time. The other candidate for prime minister that Gukasian bore in mind was the very S. Babayan, protagonist of the conflict. Although this option might make the power structure of the NKR more transparent, the Armenian leaders, including V. Sarkisian, regarded it risky. As a result, President Gukasian found no alternative but to appoint S. Babayan's protégé, fifty-six-year-old Zhirayr Pogosian.

The Karabakh media covered this first conflict between Babayan and Gukasian openly, and this openness confined the conflict within a reasonable limit. President Gukasian remarked the need to "demilitarize Karabakh" for the purpose of creating new employment and attracting the investment of Spiurka (Armenian Diaspora) to the republic. According to the president, Karabakh needed "a free atmosphere, morality <...> strong parliament, opposition, and the fourth power" (HKP. 5 June 1998). S. Babayan, for the first time since becoming defense minister, convened a press conference and tried to refute the rumor of his "almightiness" in the republic and his "dictatorial tendency" (HKP. 12 June 1998). He was forced to agree with the discharge of his brother Karen from the post of minister of internal affairs, because Karen's appointment to this post frightened the public as a concentration of all coercive institutions of the NKR to the Babayan family. In the interview I

²⁰ My interview in Yerevan on 26 December 2005.

referred to above, S. Babayan repeated his excuse: “A strong man cannot be a dictator” (because he can attract social support in a democratic way).

According to Gukasian’s supporters, rampant plunder of budget money, illegal tax exemptions for former commanders, and other kinds of corruption distinguished Z. Pogonian’s premiership (1998-99). Allegedly, the prime minister began to tap the presidential office. On June 24, 1999, Gukasian discharged the prime minister and appointed a complete outsider, A. Danielian from Crimea, to this post. Gukasian stated that flaws in his policies not only damaged the NKR’s social-economic progress, but also endangered a “sound moral-psychological atmosphere among the population” (Ազտ Արսախ: hereafter, AA. 26 June 1999). Gukasian appealed for rejection of the policy of “nothing prohibited” for a certain part of the population, and to “build a society in which law and the interests of the people, but not one or another individual, would rule” (AA. 3 July 1999). After careful coordination with Yerevan, Gukasian released S. Babayan from the post of defense minister on August 2, 1999. Gukasian appointed a professional military man to that post, while Babayan only remained as the commander of the NKR Army. Gukasian explained this reshuffling by “the need for structural transformations in the army for the purpose of making the whole political institutions function more correctly, within the limits of their competences written in law” (AA. 7 August 1999).

The gunfire in the Armenian parliament in October 1999 weakened Yerevan’s role as the supreme arbitrator of Karabakh affairs, and the political development in Karabakh became even less controllable. Armenian president R. Kocharian, who hated Babayan personally, continued to support the civilian authorities and their cause to demilitarize Karabakh. In November, 1999, the NKR law-enforcement organs en masse arrested the former commanders, who, according to President Gukasian, “terrorized the people for a long time” (AA. 20 November 1999). For many of the arrested, criminal cases started.

On the pretext of the attempted assault on Prime Minister A. Danielian on December 14, 1999, Gukasian discharged S. Babayan from the post of commander of the Army. He explained the motivation a month later: “Instead of executing his direct obligations,” the ex-commander “tried to be involved in the economy and intervene in the government’s work” (AA. 22 January 2000). At the same time, the pro-presidential activists created a parallel veteran organization, counterweighed against the existing Erkrap (Guardians) – the bastion of pro-Babayan activists. This measure found certain support among veterans, since Erkrap was highly politicized and paid little attention to its authentic duty, that is, the social welfare of veterans. It was clear that the split of the veteran organization would deliver a final blow to Babayan by depriving him of the chance to win the parliamentary elections in June 2000.

The chairman of the Council of Erkrap requested the simultaneous resignation of S. Babayan and President Gukasian. He emphasized that nobody, except for the soldiers who had warred, had the right to request S. Babayan’s resignation and that the NKR authorities should belong to those who had “shed blood for this land” (AA. 1 January 2000). Initiators of the pro-presidential veteran organization furiously criticized this statement, noting that “none has the right to privatize the victory” and the attempt to divide society into those who had warred and not warred was “an empty and unconvincing venture.” These activists supported the president’s “revolutionary step” against the “military-police orders” that dominated the republic and requested that the freedom they acquired “through the war, at the cost of blood” be returned to the people (AA. 15 January 2000). Thus, memories of the war and victory could be exploited by both camps.

Remarkably, even at this stage, the political struggle had not lost its public features. Both camps organized meetings and adopted resolutions openly. The pro-presidential fac-

tion created a party named the Union of Democratic Artsakh (hereafter, UDA), which allied with the Dashnak Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation: see below) and defeated Erkrap in the parliamentary elections of 2000. The official newspaper, *Azat Artsuakh*, continued to publish opposition (pro-Babayan) materials “for pluralism.”

On March 22, 2000, a group of terrorists assaulted President Gukasian, who was seriously injured. Since this group included Babayan’s guardsman and relative, he was arrested on April 3. The real picture of this event has remained mysterious. In his interview with me, Babayan remarked that the attackers used shots, not ballots, which professional terrorists never use to kill a target inside a car. The criminal case, the verdict of which was obvious before it started, caused suspicion even among the people who believed S. Babayan’s certain involvement in the attempted murder. Nevertheless, this criminal case was effective enough to demythologize Babayan. A veteran of the Karabakh War explained the background to the whole Babayan incident: “The general’s closest entourage, sharing his peculiar aureole of infallibility, is to blame for that. <...> Having become the symbol of the successes of our army and its brilliant victory <...> the young general began to suffer conceit” (AA. 1 April 2000).

Babayan was under detention in a basement of the NKR security organ building for a year, and confined in a prison in Shushi, near Stepanakert, for three and half years. He claims that he was tortured, not allowed to have light in the basement, or to read newspapers and books in prison. Ironically, Amnesty Azerbaijan raised the issue of the human rights of Babayan, who had tormented the country ten years before, in the international community. Babayan had the medical staff falsify his health report and received presidential amnesty in September 2004. He moved to Yerevan to return to high politics.

FAILED ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO THE IDEAS OF 1988 IN THE NKR

Among the nine parties that participated in the parliamentary elections in June 2005, the Dashnak Party, or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (hereafter, ARF), has the longest history.²¹ In the second half of the 1980s, the ARF revived both in mainland Armenia and Karabakh. The ARF was the first political force that predicted that the Karabakh problem could not be solved exclusively through peaceful negotiations.²² After the intensification of armed conflicts with Azerbaijan, the ARF distributed weapons among the Armenians and organized partisan detachments. As a result of the parliamentary elections in December 1991, the ARF gained a ruling position in the Karabakh parliament and its leader, Artur Mkrtychyan, became the speaker. In April 1992, Mkrtychyan died in mysterious circumstances and Georgy Petrosian from the same party chaired parliament until 1995,

²¹ This party was born in 1892 in Georgia with a left nationalist program. Their slogan for Armenia’s independence was not popular among the Armenians, whose economic activities benefitted from the imperial space of the two empires – Russian and Ottoman. The genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman territory in 1915 and the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 changed this situation. The ARF was the ruling party during Armenia’s temporary independence in 1918-20, during which Armenia struggled with Azerbaijan over the domination of Karabakh. In 1920, the ARF voluntarily abandoned power to evade the sandwich attack by Turkey and Azerbaijan with the help of Bolshevik Russia.

²² My interview with Sergei Shakhverdian, editor of the Karabakh ARF’s organ *Aparazh* (Rock) in Stepanakert on 15 April 2005.

when the ARF lost deputy seats. After passing the state power to the SCD in 1992,²³ until 2000, when the NKR civilian authorities won the struggle with the generalship, the ARF was constantly in opposition. In contrast to their mainland comrades, ARF activists in Karabakh did not suffer internal repressions during the first half of the 1990s, but the party became so exhausted by the war that it could not participate in the parliamentary elections in 1995 and passively supported Kocharian in the 1996 presidential elections. The ARF resolutely supported President Gukasian in his struggle with Babayan's faction, and recovered its reputation. As a result of the parliamentary elections in 2000, the ARF gained about 30 percent of the vote and nine of the thirty-three deputy seats, while the ruling UDA gained only thirteen seats. This performance becomes more impressive if compared with mainland Armenia, in which the ARF gains, as a rule, only about 10 percent of the vote.

The popularity of Gukasian, established in his brave resistance to militarism in 1998-2000, resulted in the fact that the ARF and even the Communists supported him in the presidential election in August 2002, as a result of which Gukasian overwhelmed his rivals, gaining 88.4 percent of the vote. Signing an agreement with the ruling UDA proposing anti-corruption policy, recovery of the "emancipated," namely depopulated, villages, etc., the ARF participated in the government coalition. On the other hand, this election revealed the apathy of the urban population; in contrast to the normal turnout in the whole republic (75.7 percent), in Stepanakert, only 52.1 percent of the voters participated in the election (AA. 17 August 2002). A year later, the ARF left the coalition and created an opposition block with a new centrist party, Movement-88, created in 2003.

As its name symbolizes, this party appealed to return to the moral values of 1988, the moment of birth of the Karabakh movement, when many families lived in the basements to be saved from Azerbaijan shells. During the 1990s, according to this party, the unity of the people disappeared because of polarization of society, corruption, and the insufficient judicial system.²⁴ The initiator of this movement was Edvard Agabegian, physician by profession and winner of the mayoral election of Stepanakert in 2004. The ideologue of this movement was Gegam Bagdasarian, editor of a liberal opposition newspaper, *Demo*, and chairman of the Stepanakert press club. In the municipal elections in 2004, the bloc of ARF and M-88 won the mayoralty of Stepanakert and another eighty-five municipalities.

On the eve of the parliamentary elections of 2005, this bloc did not doubt its victory, which would lead to cohabitation of the president from the UDA and the prime minister from this opposition bloc. However, the bloc obtained only three of the thirty-three deputy mandates, while the UDA gained twelve seats. A completely new party, Free Fatherland, gained ten seats. The UDA referred to Free Fatherland as an ally but constructive opposition, while the bloc ARF and M-88 regarded this party as an instrument of the ruling UDA to distract and absorb critical votes.

Toward the presidential election on July 19, 2007, for which the incumbent Gukasian is constitutionally prohibited to run, Karabakh elites coordinated their interests carefully. The ruling coalition chose Bako Sahakian (b. 1960), participant of the Karabakh movement from the beginning with a brilliant career as an army officer (the 1990s), minister of the interior (1999-2001), and chief of NKR security (after 2001) (www.president.nkr.am/en/president/). If Gukasian created the UDA, Sahakian threw himself into public politics through Free Fatherland. Sahakian enjoys authority among the Karabakh population be-

²³ Shakhverdin compared this bitter decision made by the ARF in 1992 with that in 1920, when the ARF voluntarily passed state power to the Bolsheviks to be defended from the Turks.

²⁴ My interviews with Edvard Agabegian on 18 April 2005 and Gegam Bagdasarian on 20 April 2005, both in Stepanakert.

cause of his devoted service to the republic. Nevertheless, it is obvious that he lacks the eloquence and attractive outlook that his predecessor Gukasian, with his journalistic and diplomatic background, was blessed with. When Gukasian gave a speech in Yerevan, he outshone all mainland politicians. This talent greatly contributed to neutralizing the NKR's bloody image in the world.

On May 8, 2007, unexpectedly, the opposition bloc ARF and M-88 declared support for Sahakian (Politics 2007). The mainland ARF pressured its Karabakh branch not to challenge the ruling coalition. The leader of M-88, Edvard Agabegian, made his choice, based on the principle that "if one cannot beat the rival, one should ally with him." Gegam Bagdasarian, the second leader of M-88, furiously protested this decision and practically left the party. His faction within M-88, together with dissidents from the ARF, campaigned for the second-rated contender (but far from a likely winner), the NKR deputy foreign minister Masis Mayilyan, who gained, as a result, only 12.2 percent of the vote, far behind Sahakian's 85.4 percent. This presidential election put an end to the attempt to revitalize Karabakh politics by returning to belligerent democracy. Moreover, Karabakh's tradition of pluralism and public competition, as well as its self-assured civilization discourse ("we are more civilized than CIS standards, let alone Azerbaijan's"), would seem to have been lost. Gegam laments: Soccer is usually played by two teams, but if you earnestly wish to improvise soccer played by one team, you may. But in this case, you cannot match in the World Cup. There is the only and universal rule for soccer and there cannot be Caucasian, Zimbabwean, or whatever soccer at all.²⁵

During the first half of the 2000s, Karabakh was a successful example of a democratizing unrecognized state, partly because of the attempt to return to belligerent democracy. When this strategy ceased to produce effect, Karabakh could not rely upon ethnic factors to revitalize its political process, in contrast to Abkhazia and Transnistria. This is why Karabakh quickly degraded into clientelist politics, typical of CIS countries.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN ABKHAZIA IN 2004²⁶

In Abkhazia, two motifs for political activation, return to belligerent democracy and emphasis on Abkhazia's multi-ethnic characteristics, joined in the dramatic presidential election in 2004. The leader of the Abkhaz movement, Vladislav Ardzinba (b. 1945), professional Orientalist and director of the Abkhazian Institute of Language, Literature and History, was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1989. He became chairman of the Sub-Commission on State Status of Autonomies and actively cooperated with other leaders of the autonomous republics of the Soviet Union (for example, Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan) to raise these entities' status.²⁷ This sub-commission's activities facilitated the deconstruction of the hierarchy of union and autonomous republics of the USSR (Жакоба 2004b, 152 - 153).

²⁵ Bagdasarian's e-mail message to me, on 10 September 2008.

²⁶ For details about Abkhazia's post-war political history, see Мауызато (2006) and Skakov (2005).

²⁷ If the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Socialist Republic requested to change its belonging from Azerbaijan to Armenia, the Abkhazian autonomy requested to recover the union republic status that it had enjoyed until 1931, or to change its belonging from Georgia to the RSFSR. The Abkhazians tend to perceive their painful experiences during socialism as having derived from the autonomy's subordination to Georgia (Жакоба 2004a; Mihalkanin 2004, 144-146).

In the presidential election in 1999, none dared to challenge the incumbent, V. Ardzinba, for whom 99 percent voted. A total of 97.5 percent supported the constitution (*Нужная газета*, 5 October 1999, 2). During the same period, however, Ardzinba fell ill and his leadership became progressively authoritarian, accompanied by crony appointments.²⁸ When it became obvious that Ardzinba would not run for the next term of presidency, competition for the succession intensified. A reliable way for this purpose was to become prime minister or, at least, a key minister.²⁹ This was the reason for the leapfrogging reshuffling of prime ministers in 1999-2004, during which Ardzinba appointed four prime ministers. Facing this crisis of power, a number of renowned notables, including heroes of the war, established the first organized opposition, Aitaira in February 2000. Aitaira remarked the negative tendencies in post-war Abkhazia that “in society, the sense of exhaustion is strengthening; the people are progressively alienated from power,” and requested further democratization by constitutional amendments to introduce the Constitutional Court, Board of Audit, and Ombudsman, to guarantee judges’ status, and to have district chief administrators elected by the population (*Айтайра* 3 (66). 16 March 2004, 2; Skakov 2005, 165).³⁰ In 2003, Aitaira added the demand to adopt a law on mass media and to transform the existing highly presidentialized semi-presidential regime into a more typically semi-presidential one, by granting parliament the right to confirm presidential candidates for prime minister (Skakov 2005, 165). In fairness, it should be added that, running for presidency in 2004, Ardzinba’s successor, Raul Khadzhimba, also argued for the same prerogative of parliament (*Ibid.*, 177).

The parliamentary elections in 2002 should have been the first trial for Aitaira, but it decided to boycott the elections after the Central Electoral Commission rejected the registration of several Aitaira candidates. In April 2003, Ardzinba appointed Raul Khadzhimba to the premier post and, in July 2004, appealed to the public to regard Khadzhimba as his successor in the presidential elections coming in October. Since Khadzhimba had been recruited from the security organ (*Лакоба* 2006b, 192), the Abkhazians assumed Putin’s commitment to this selection. In May 2004, three oppositional organizations – Aitaira, a veteran organization named *Amtsakhara* (Beacon Fire), and *United Abkhazia* – unified to propose the candidacies of former prime minister Sergei Bagapsh (for president) and famous historian Stanislav Lakoba (for vice president).

The political situation of Abkhazia became tense on the eve of voting. On September 30, Russian parliamentarians and artists visited Abkhazia to celebrate its Independence Day. They transformed the most sacred event for Abkhazia into an electoral campaign for Khadzhimba. The Russians not only agitated, but even associated Russia’s future aid to Abkhazia with Khadzhimba’s victory. Comedian Oleg Gazmanov apparently confused where he had come, and sent the crowd a greeting – “Good afternoon, Adjaria!” When journalists politely corrected him, he responded, “What difference does it make?” The par-

²⁸ My interview with Sergei Shamba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, in Sukhum on 22 August 2006; Skakov (2005, 159, 161).

²⁹ My interview with A. Taniya, assistant of the “first president” of Abkhazia, in Sukhum on 22 August 2006.

³⁰ According to law, the president is obliged to appoint the district chief administrator from among the deputies of the district assembly. Even after 2004, often missing proper candidates, President Bagapsh was forced to bypass the law by a tricky way: appointing an “acting” chief administrator from outside the assembly and holding a local election as soon as possible to make the man a deputy, and only after that, stripping the adjective “acting” from the mayor’s title (My interview with Sergei Bagapsh, president of Abkhazia, in Sukhum on 23 August 2006).

liament of Abkhazia convened on October 1 to discuss this overt violation of the electoral law (Республика Абхазия: hereafter, PA. 5 – 6 October 2004, 1).

After the voting on October 3, the Central Electoral Commission could not publish the result for a long time, justifying this delay by “numerous violations of the electoral law in Gal District.” Bagapsh’s camp interpreted this as the CEC not wishing to count the votes in that district because the overwhelming majority of the Gal Mingrelians supported Bagapsh (see below).³¹ As late as October 11, 2004, the CEC declared that Bagapsh gained 50.08 percent of the eligible vote and thus won the election in the first round (PA. 14 – 15 October 2004, 1). Khadzhimba’s supporters did not comply with this announcement and requested to hold the final round or to repeat the election. State institutions of Abkhazia – the CEC, Supreme Court, and parliament – split and adopted decisions contradicting those adopted earlier. The both camps mobilized supporters, often weapons in hands, from the whole republic to Sukhum, who physically seized buildings of the government, parliament, and state broadcasting company. Skirmishes caused a fatality, and explosions took place in Sukhum.

Russia intensified intervention in Abkhazian affairs. On November 2, 2004, both candidates were invited to Moscow and had talks with the Russian leadership, in particular, the chief of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, and secretary of the Security Council, Igor Ivanov. The Russian leaders requested to cancel the result of the vote on October 3 and repeat the election (PA. 4 – 5 November 2004, 1). Krasnodar governor Aleksandr Tkachev threatened the Abkhazians with his intention to close the Abkhazian border on the Psau River. In fact, Russia tightened up its border control at that post; a large portion of Abkhazian fruit addressed to Russia rotted at the border.

Bagapsh proposed the compromise solution to Khadzhimba of repeating the elections in a single team, granting Khadzhimba the post of vice president or prime minister. After hesitance, eventually, Khadzhimba agreed to become vice president. On December 6, 2004, they signed a protocol making the vice president post meaningful. The vice president of Abkhazia will be responsible for the so-called coercive bloc (military, security, and police) and handle 40 percent of the budget and cabinet members.³² Parliament adopted a law on the first president of Abkhazia, which guarantees Ardzinba not only personal inviolability but even budget money and the apparatus to run his political activities (PA. 14 – 15 December 2004, 1). This compromise satisfied Russia, which therefore opened the border. On January 12, 2005, the presidential election was held and Bagapsh, in tandem with Khadzhimba, gained 91.5 percent of the vote (Апсырпесс. № 16, 14 January 2005.).

MINGRELIANS AND MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN ABKHAZIA

³¹ During my fieldwork in Gal District on 25 August 2006, my question about the “massive violations in the Gal District” only provoked laughter among village leaders of Shashkvara of that district. On the other hand, however, it was obvious that they ardently mobilized the vote for Bagapsh. I was made to partake in their toasts “for district and republican leaders,” repeated many times with *chacha* (a Georgian and Abkhazian spirit of 80 proof).

³² Khadzhimba’s responsibility for the “coercive bloc” proved to be nominal from the beginning (Skakov 2005, 183) and, seemingly, had dwindled even further, as was shown by Bagapsh’s exclusive exposure in the mass media in the August crisis in 2008.

After its seizure of power, Aitaira died out as a public organization.³³ When I conducted fieldwork in Abkhazia in August 2006, none of the components of the political reform, which Bagapsh promised, had been realized. The government continues to control broadcasting.³⁴ Parliament failed to prepare a new electoral law including proportional elements by the 2007 parliamentary elections, which were therefore conducted on a purely majoritarian principle, exceptional even for CIS countries. The popular election of local chiefs remains a future target. Thus, the effect of slogans to return to the primordial ideals of independent Abkhazia proved to be ephemeral. As if to compensate for this situation, Bagapsh tried to activate Abkhazian politics by widening the ethnic basis of the state.

The first step in this direction was made by the precedent president V. Ardzinba in 1998 by recognizing the Mingrelians (a Georgian subgroup who account for more than 90 percent of Abkhazia's most southeasterly district of Gal) as a legitimate ethnic component of the Abkhazian state. Sergei Markedonov calls this move a "New Eastern Policy" (Маркедонов 2006с, 115).

In 1993, most of the Gal Mingrelians evacuated with Georgian troops to the other side of the Ingur River, but the unbearable conditions in Georgia's refugee camps induced them to return to their native district after the ceasefire. The Abkhazian authorities did not have a consistent policy toward them, whose complete return might reverse the demographic balance of Abkhazia to the advantage of the Georgians again. In the mid-1990s, the Abkhazian authorities began to promote Mingrelian identity and language in Gal. For example, the district administration began to sponsor a newspaper printed in Mingrelian, which does not exist in Georgia itself.³⁵ The military conflict between Georgian paramilitary groups and the Abkhazian army in Gal in April-May 1998 produced ambivalent results. Abkhazia abandoned its voluntary suspension of holding the constitutional referendum and the popular presidential elections. On the other hand, after the conflict caused many of the returnees

³³ In contrast, supporters of Ardzinba and Khadzhimba established a party, Forum for the People's Unity of Abkhazia (FPUA). Largely, hard-line patriots and leftist populists among the former Ardzinba's supporters participated in this party, which criticized Bagapsh for his compromising attitude to such issues as repatriation of Georgian refugees and foreign entrepreneurs' participation in privatization. This party has its press and had eight of the thirty-five deputies in the previous parliament, though its influence decreased as a result of the parliamentary elections in 2007. Now, twenty-eight of the thirty-five deputies belong to the pro-Bagapsh coalition, while only seven deputies belong to the opposition. The FPUA is quite skeptical as to the necessity of political reforms. According to its representatives, the proposed Constitutional Court and Board of Audit might become bureaucratic superstructures if there were no readiness among the population. Why is it not sufficient to strengthen the Supreme Court's supervision of constitutional affairs? (my interviews with A. Taniya; D. Ashba, co-chairman of the FPUA, in Sukhum on 22 August 2006). The FPUA would seem more pro-Russia than the ruling coalition. The occupation of the Kodor Canyon by Georgia in 2006-2008 fueled this sentiment among the Abkhazian public.

³⁴ Interview with Tamaz Ketsba, leader of the NGO "Civil Initiative and Man of the Future," one of the former leaders of Aitaira, in Sukhum on 18 August 2006. For economic reasons, it is difficult to open private alternative TV channels in Abkhazia. According to President Bagapsh, an alternative state TV channel is an unaffordable luxury for a state in siege (interview with me, 23 August 2006). For fairness, I may add that during my stay, I was invited to participate in a TV debate show, entitled *Argama*, which is very popular in Abkhazia. Representatives of the government, opposition, and foreign scholars were in the studio and spoke (as far as I observed) without any self-censorship.

³⁵ When this newspaper, titled "Gal," was founded in 1995, Georgian president E. Shevardnadze called Ardzinba directly, asked and threatened not to have this edition published (my interview with N. Salakaya, Chief editor of the newspaper "Gal," on 25 August 2006 in Gal.).

to flee again (Mihalkanin 2004, 151; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008, 490), President Ardzinba appealed to the Gal population to return. Simultaneously, Abkhazian leaders started to popularize the following kind of discourse:

Mingrelians are different from Georgians. We fought with the latter, not the former. At least after the nineteenth century, Mingrelians have been a native population in southeast Abkhazia, while the Georgians, who began to settle in other districts to the west of Gal (such as Ochamchir, Sukhum, and Gagra) after 1937, were artificial immigrants mobilized from inner and mountainous Georgia for the purpose of Georgianizing Abkhazia. While Mingrelians in the Gal District maintained neutrality during the Georgian-Abkhazian War, Georgian villages in the neighboring districts had practically become Georgian military bases, which Abkhazian troops had no other choice but to destroy. Mingrelians have a legitimate right to return, but the repatriation of other Georgians should depend on the progress of mutual Georgian-Abkhazian trust....³⁶

Georgia interprets these moves as attempting to split the Georgian nation into prerevolutionary subcategories. In mainland Georgia, the Mingrelians and eastern (authentic) Georgians are so closely intertwined that Abkhazia's official Mingrelianism has not produced any impact reaching beyond the Ingur River, but this policy is sufficiently effective to secure the Gal Mingrelians' loyalty to the Abkhazian state.³⁷

The second step towards the widening of the ethnic basis of the Abkhazian state was Sergei Bagapsh's victory in the presidential elections in 2004, a significant reason for which was the Mingrelians' ardent support. There were several reasons for Bagapsh's popularity among the Gal Mingrelians. First, the mighty propaganda against Bagapsh for being pro-Georgian convinced them to vote for him. Secondly, during the 1980s, he worked in the neighboring Ochamchir District as the first secretary of the CPSU district committee and after being discharged from the premier post in 1999, he returned to the district to become general director of the company Black Sea Energy. Thirdly and no less importantly, his wife is Mingrelian.³⁸

The third step to strengthen ethnic basis of the Abkhazian state was the pro-Bagapsh coalition's victory in the parliamentary elections in 2007. Bagapsh appealed to raise the proportion of non-Abkhazians (in particular, Armenians and Russians) in parliament. He even requested an opposition candidate with Abkhaz origin to change his electoral district to secure a seat for the Russians' representative (Popjanevski 2008).

Being loyal to the Abkhazian state, however, the Gal Mingrelians continue to identify themselves as Georgians in their Abkhazian passports and go back and forth beyond the Ingur River, taking the UN bus combining both banks. They teach their children in Georgian at school, self-restrictively qualifying Mingrelian as a non-literal language. Famous

³⁶ My interviews with Sergei Shamba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, on 22 August 2006 in Sukhum and R. Kushnariya, Chairman of the Gal District Council, interviewed by Matsuzato on 25 August 2006 in Gal.

³⁷ Clogg's analysis of ethnic politics in Abkhazia leaves room for reconsideration, because she almost artificially rejects the category of the Mingrelians, while admitting that "many [Abkhazians] distinguish between the Gal/i population and official Tbilisi" (Clogg 2008, 320). I am not trying here to judge to what extent this category is "real," as Abkhazia leaders argue, or "artificial," as Georgian leaders tend to think. The point is that it is impossible to understand ethnic politics in Abkhazia without examining the consequences of the Abkhazian authorities' discourse and policies to distinguish what they call the Mingrelians from the Georgians.

³⁸ My interview with L. Kvarcheliya and A. Inal-Ipa, leaders of the NGO "Center for Humanitarian Programs," in Sukhum on 17 August 2006.

linguist George Hewitt laments that Mingrelian is not used for education even in the Gal District, but this is the population's own desire.³⁹

THE BLOCKADE OF TRANSNISTRIA AFTER 2006

Before examining the domestic politics of Transnistria, let me make a small digression from our main course of argument to overview the border blockade of Transnistria after 2006, because this issue is unavoidable for an understanding of Transnistria. The climax of normalization of Moldova-Transnistrian relations was the Moscow Memorandum signed by Presidents Petru Lucinski and Igor Smirnov on May 8, 1997, which granted Transnistria the rights to export a certain quota of commodities, bypassing Moldovan customs control. This compromise produced the "miracle of Transnistria" (recovery) in the late 1990s and early 2000s.⁴⁰ However, the current parliament speaker and the young leader of the Innovation Party, Evgenii Shevchuk (b. 1968),⁴¹ recalls this period of the second Supreme Soviet (1995-2000) as a time of stagnation. It is true that the Transnistrian parliament refused to pass the president's draft proposal for a new emergency law (Kolstø and Malgin 1998, 115), but, according to Shevchuk, much more vigorous policies for adaptation to market economy were needed then. Inertia of the war limited the Transnistrians' view to within a state capitalism, supposed to be more capable in hostilities.⁴²

When "Communist" and "pro-Russian" Vladimir Voronin became the president of Moldova in 2001, the Transnistrians expected a further normalization of their relations with Moldova. The conflict around the Novo-Nyamets Monastery in the spring-summer of 2001 (Иванов 2001) dissipated this ephemeral hope. However, the real reason for Voronin's shift to a tough position in regard to the PMR was that he found support from the Putin administration, which thought it possible to deviate Moldova from its pro-Western position during the 1990s. For this purpose, Putin was even ready to sacrifice Transnistria. In the presidential elections in December 2001, both Russia and Moldova supported the alternative candidate, the former mayor of Bendery City, who appealed for "conditional reunification with Moldova and [was] at the same time pro-Putin." The RTR and other Russian TV channels (which Transnistrian citizens usually watch) provided mighty propaganda that the PMR is a base of narcotic trade and human trafficking (Анорей 2001). Nevertheless, Smirnov gained 81.9 percent of the vote. The negative image of the PMR that the Russian liberal intelligentsia cherishes today was, to a significant extent, created during this electoral campaign. The Putin administration harassed Russian enterprises trading with Transnistria.

³⁹ The Mingrelians' attitude towards "higher" Georgian culture reminds us of a famous aphorism conveying East Slavic identity in the early modern Polish Commonwealth – "gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus" (Ukrainian or Belarusian by birth, but Polish as a political nation). Nevertheless, the complete dependence of the Mingrelian children of Gal on Georgian textbooks restricts their future, since they can only proceed to higher-education institutions in the Georgian territory and cannot expect careers outside of it, lacking command of both Russian and Abkhazian. Conscious of the significance of the knowledge of Russian and Abkhazian for children, the parents and teachers of the Gal District are impatiently waiting for a supply of textbooks in Russian and Abkhazian from Sukhum, which has not been realized because of insufficiency of the state budget.

⁴⁰ At the beginning of this century, the economy and living standards looked much better in Transnistria than in Moldova (King 2001, 538). This gap began to shrink under Moldovan president Voronin, who conducted more or less effective social policies and was, perhaps, reversed by the blockade of Transnistria after 2006.

⁴¹ See his biography at: <http://vsprm.org/Deputy/?ID=46> (Accessed: 6 November 2008).

⁴² My interview with Evgenii Shevchuk, vice speaker of the PMR Supreme Soviet, in Tiraspol on 21 October 2003.

It was a blessing for Transnistria that its competitive manufacturing could find new buyers in the West, if the Russians refused to buy.⁴³

Putin's troubleshooter Dmitry Kozak's serious talks with both countries to prepare the so-called Kozak Memorandum and the eventual US intervention, which made Voronin reject the memorandum on the very day of signature in November 2003 (Quinlan 2004),⁴⁴ changed Putin's pro-Voronin attitude. The years of 2003-2004 were a fatal period for the PMR, which became sandwiched between the EU expansion from the west and the colored revolutions in the east. Poorly acquainted with the Transnistrian issue, the EU entrusted this problem to the OSCE and the United States during the 1990s. The approaching of its frontier to the Black Sea, the desire to stabilize the former Yugoslavia from the east, and, perhaps, the need to provide the EU officers (mainly from New Europe) released from duties in Kosovo with new workplaces removed the EU's self-restriction.

On September 1, 2001, immediately after the conflict around the Novo-Nyamets Monastery, President Voronin renewed the seal of the Moldovan Customs Service. In other words, he practically canceled the export quota guaranteed to Transnistria by the 1997 Memorandum and placed Transnistria's foreign trade under Moldova's benevolence. This policy was unrealizable, however, as long as Ukraine under Kuchma closed its eyes to Transnistria's "smuggling." Thus, in 2004, in reprisal against the conflict around Romanian schools in Transnistria (Roper 2006), Moldova ceased to issue certificating documents to commodities exported from Transnistria, but Ukrainian prime minister Viktor Yanukovich continued to allow Transnistria's export via Ukrainian territory. As a natural result, he became a very popular politician in Transnistria.

In April 2005, new Ukrainian president Yushchenko made public his plan for the solution to the Transnistrian problem. It was, however, unrealistic to expect Moldova to agree with the plan to conduct elections in Transnistria under international observation to make the polity a "party of conflict," legally capable of international negotiation. As early as in July of that year, the Moldovan parliament adopted a resolution that practically canceled the contents of the "Yushchenko plan." By the same summer, Yushchenko's staff abandoned the ambition to make their president exert independent leadership in the Black Sea Rims and, instead, began to think it advantageous in the long run to participate in the border control requested by the EU and Moldova and secure better conditions in negotiation for Ukraine's WTO accession (which was realized in February 2008), even if this damaged the Ukrainian economy in the short run. Possibly, Yushchenko had not forgotten that more than 90 percent of the Transnistrian Ukrainians (those who had Ukrainian citizenship) voted for Yanukovich in 2004.⁴⁵

On March 3, 2006, the Ukrainian government banned the passage of all Transnistrian commodities, unless they had the Moldovan Customs Service's seal. The Ukrainian border

⁴³ My interview with Grigory Marakutsa, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the PMR, in Tiraspol on 20 October 2003.

⁴⁴ In an interview with me, William Hill, head of the OSCE Mission in Moldova in 1999-2006, said that he could persuade representatives of the United States and Europe to agree with the draft of the Kozak Memorandum, but immediately before its signature, Russia added the notorious article on the dislocation of Russian troops until 2020, which was beyond the patience of the West (interview in New Orleans, 17 November 2007). Aleksandr Voloshin, head of the Russian presidential administration in 1999-2003, told me in the aforementioned interview that President Voronin asked to add the article no earlier than the final stage of negotiation, for fear of criticism by the opposition (interview in Tokyo, 25 January 2008).

⁴⁵ In contrast to the presidential elections in 2004, no polling places were organized in Transnistria for the parliamentary elections in 2006.

of Transnistria was put under the control of the EUBAM. Thus, Transnistrian enterprises were deprived of the rights to export unless they were registered in both Transnistria and Moldova, paying taxes and customs doubly. Unsurprisingly, they lost competitiveness in the international market. The Transnistrian government argues that the daily loss for the country is from two to two and half million US dollars. Considering that the annual transactions between the Transnistria and Ukrainian regions bordered with Transnistria amounted to 270,000,000 US dollars (Kulik and Yakushik 2008, 181), the loss Ukraine suffered from this policy would seem enormous as well. Nevertheless, during two and half years of joint border control (until October 2008), the EUBAM has neither found weapons or commercial narcotics, nor enslaved women.

In 2007, several EUBAM and EU officers began to express distrust of Moldova's allegiance of Transnistria as being a criminal "black hall" of Europe. Possibly against this background, the EU is modifying its policy toward Transnistria. The OSCE excluded Evgenii Shevchuk and other several Transnistrian leaders from the black list of people, prohibited to visit Europe.⁴⁶ In May, 2007, Shevchuk was invited to Brussels to deliver a speech at the European Parliament.

INNOVATION, INSTEAD OF RETURN: TRANSNISTRIA'S ADVANCE TO PLURALISM

Despite the comparatively limited scale of atrocities that the Transnistrians suffered during the conflict in 1991-92, even more books and photo albums, conveying visual evidence of these atrocities to the international community and the next generation of the republic, have been published in Transnistria than in Karabakh and Abkhazia (generally, Transnistria has retained a Soviet-style print culture, which pays little attention to the cost efficiency of publications). In real politics, however, Transnistrian politicians do not seem to find it necessary to appeal to the war memories of the population.

Evgenii Shevchuk's corporation, named Sheriff, controls the retail market of Transnistria. There is a plausible rumor that Sheriff spends more money on its security and guards than the PMR spends on its security. Many of the leaders of the Innovation Party are young, energetic businessmen. The irritation they feel under the everlasting Smirnov administration seems similar to what Abkhazian young leaders felt in the last months of the Ardzinba administration: Why does the old man, who obviously does not understand the market economy, and his sons continue to rule the republic's economy? Why does the republic need to respond to the provocations and demagogies provided by the former suzerains passively? Why are they not able to set an agenda and make the former suzerain respond?⁴⁷

When Shevchuk won the parliamentary elections in 2000, Speaker Grigory Marakutsa recruited him to the post of vice chairman. When Shevchuk was reelected and his Innovation Party gained twenty-three of the entire forty-three seats of parliament in 2005, leaving

⁴⁶ The European Commission adopted this sanction against PMR leaders on February 27, 2003, and in 2004, the US followed it. Shevchuk himself has not been able to identify the reasons for this softening of sanction (e-mail reply to my question, dated September 30, 2008). A possible interpretation is that the EU became tired of the constant disinformation emitted from Chisinau, and began to regard the PMR as a serious partner for negotiation, exactly as happened to the OSCE mission a decade ago. For this purpose, it was necessary to distinguish more reasonable members of the Transnistrian leadership from the odious ones.

⁴⁷ My interviews with Shevchuk in 2003 and Alkhas Tkhasusiev, deputy of the Abkhazian parliament, on 18 August 2006 in Sukhum.

tangibly behind the pro-presidential Republican Party, Marakutsa passed his position to Shevchuk. Transnistrian leaders will remember for a long time Marakutsa's speech of recommendation: "I found this young man and I raised him. I will vote for him and wish you, respected deputies, to follow me." The scenario around executive power has not developed in such a beautiful manner.

Igor Smirnov was determined to rerun for the presidential election of December 2006, despite his advanced age of sixty-five. Thirty-eight-year-old Shevchuk stuck to his ethical principle of evading running for the presidential post, unless Smirnov himself decided to retire. The leadership of Russia bet on Smirnov, who in turn asked Putin for a huge sum of monetary aid for the success of the September 2006 referendum, which confirmed Transnistria's independence and its future associative relations with Russia (the Puerto Rican model), and subsequently, the presidential elections of December. The Russian government agreed, but also requested Smirnov to conduct political and monetary reforms. The former included, as already mentioned, the abolition of "full presidentialism," while the latter was needed for convertibility of the Transnistrian ruble to the Russian ruble. Reelected Smirnov shelved these reforms and relations with Russia became tense in 2007. Russian high officials asked Shevchuk during his visit to Moscow why President Smirnov behaved this way. Shevchuk replied by parodying a Ukrainian proverb: "It is no use crying over spilt milk" (*Bachili ochi, shcho kupovali*, meaning "You have seen what you bought").⁴⁸

Seeking for a way to settle the "wine war" with Russia, the Voronin administration of Moldova immediately noticed the discord between Russia and Transnistria, which could not but be used. The Russian government in the past would have responded to such an initiative immediately, once Smirnov broke his word, but Russia has found the patience to wait for Smirnov's change of mind for months. It is impressive that Russia, which had been arrogant enough in 2004 to close its Abkhazian border because of the Abkhazian people's disobedience in not voting for Khadzhimba supported by Putin, has become so patient.

THE FATE OF MOLDOVANISM IN TRANSNISTRIA

If Abkhazia has intensified the policy of incorporating the Mingrelians into the national community, the opposite recently took place in Transnistria in regard to another transborder nationality, the Moldovans. Facing rampant pan-Romanian nationalism in Moldova in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which denied the very existence of the Moldovan nationality and language,⁴⁹ it was not difficult for Transnistrian leaders to justify their emerging breakaway polity not only as defender of the Russophone and Ukrainophone populations, but also as the last bastion of Moldovan identity. When the second convention of Pridnestr deputies of all levels deliberated on the name of the new polity in September 1990, Northern and Ukrainian deputies requested to name it simply the "Pridnestr Republic." The convention rejected this idea and added the adjective "Moldovan." This episode reveals how important the Moldovanist legitimizing cause was for the emerging polity. Three young

⁴⁸ My interview with Aleksei Martynov, executive secretary of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the States / Members of the Association "For Democracy and the Rights of Peoples," in Moscow on 27 August 2007.

⁴⁹ For example, the Moldovan government chose "A History of Romanians" written by P. Panaitescu in 1943 under the pro-fascist government (P. Panaitescu, *Istoria romanilor*, reprinted in Chişinău, 1992) for the teaching of history. Unfortunately, I have not acquainted myself with this book. Moldovanist historian Petr Shornikov evaluates Panaitescu as "sufficiently objective" "in comparison with the present Romanianists" (Шорников 2007, 9).

victims in the first serious confrontation between Transnistria and Moldova in Dubossary in November 1990 belonged to the three main nations of Transnistria. This coincidence became an important episode to creating state mythology (Бабилунга, Бомешко 1993, 14). The tandem of President Igor Smirnov (Russian) and Parliament Speaker Grigory Marakutsa (Moldovan) and the fact that a Moldovan served as rector of Pridnestr University had important symbolist significance for state building.

In March 1991, a half year after the declaration of independence, the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution to realize "Urgent Measures for Preservation of the Originality of Moldovans, their Language, and Culture," which introduced a laboratory at Pridnestr University to research the "history of Moldova and Pridnestr" (emphasized by me - K.M.) and prepare history textbooks (Бабилунга 2007, 15-16). This laboratory was filled with historians, such as Nikolai Babilunga and Boris Bomeshko, who were disgusted with pan-Romanian nationalism in Chisinau and migrated from that city to Tiraspol. After ten years, this laboratory's activities bore fruit in three volumes of "A History of the Pridnestr Moldovan Republic" (Гросул 2000-2001).

In 2001, Vladimir Voronin became Moldovan president by hoisting the slogan of Moldovanism. As with his other pro-Eurasian promises, this policy has not been realized, but, nevertheless, some Transnistrian ideologues, such as Ilya Galinsky (director of the Institute of History, Government, and Law of Pridnestr University) and Anna Volkova (PMR president's advisor) began to think it politically "incorrect and pointless" to propagate Moldovanism in Transnistria. "There are two post-Moldovan states: the Republic of Moldova and the Pridnestr Moldovan Republic. In Moldova, the official ideology is Moldovanism, while in the PMR, it is Pridnestr internationalism" (Галинский 2007). Anna Volkova echoes this opinion by formulating a new state ideology of supra-ethnic "Pridnestr patriotism."⁵⁰

In the mid-2000s, Volkova established her own sub-faculty and laboratory under the title of "History of the PMR," while Babilunga's sub-faculty of "History of the Fatherland" and laboratory of "History of Pridnestr" continued to function. Even the richest universities in the world would not be able to afford such a luxury for a long time. Since Volkova had only had publications of half-academic character,⁵¹ she edited a historical atlas of Transnistria in 2005, which should have marked her debut as professional historian. Unfortunately, this atlas included a huge amount of errors. The 2006 issue of the "Pridnestr Historical Almanac," edited by Babilunga and Bomeshko, had twenty-four pages dedicated to a devastating review of Volkova's atlas (Бабилунга Н. В. и др. 2006). As a result, this journal was discontinued, Volkova established a new historical journal, and the university decided to close Babilunga's laboratory by the end of 2007.

A dean's meeting at the university, held on July 17, 2007, practically transformed into an interrogation of Babilunga and his colleagues, who were accused for tacitly assisting Voronin. The participants of the meeting remarked that the topic of Slavo-Moldovan relations, which Babilunga's group had been involved in, was a topic of another state and had no relation with Transnistria (Приднестровских ученых 2007). Yet this tragedy for the historical science of Transnistria stimulated the pluralist development of its politics. At the end of 2007, the Supreme Soviet dominated by the Innovation Party became a new sponsor of Babilunga's laboratory, while Volkova's group became all the more dependent on the support of the presidential administration.

⁵⁰ My interview with Anna Volkova, Adviser of the PMR President, interviewed by Matsuzato on 22 August 2007 in Tiraspol.

⁵¹ She had published President Smirnov's biography (Волкова 2001) and chronological descriptions of referendums held in Transnistria (Волкова 2005).

The attempts to remove Moldovanism from the PMR's traditional menu of legitimization of the state were destined to fail. Even leaving aside the personal motivation of this attempt⁵² and academic emptiness of the concept of "Transnistrian patriotism," we have witnessed the persecuted Moldovanist historians immediately receiving international encouragement, moreover, not only from the other side of Nistru.

CONCLUSION

The aftereffects of the civil wars, from whose fires the unrecognized states were born, proved to be double edged. On the one hand, a number of leaders used the remnants of war psychology to justify authoritarianism and crony capitalism. On the other hand, memories of belligerent democracy inspired the opposition, which advocated a return to the primordial ideals of the state's foundation. However, the examples of Aitaira in Abkhazia and Movement-88 in the NKR show that the effects of this discourse of "return" have been ephemeral. Another impulse toward political revitalization came from the emphasis on their multi-national characteristics, though mono-ethnic Karabakh cannot rely upon this strategy. Abkhazian politicians revealed an impressive "growth" in this sense, gradually widening the ethnic basis of the Abkhazian state not only in their outward speeches, but also in harsh struggles in electoral politics. The same can be said for Transnistria, where the multiethnic composition of the country continues to be a source of state legitimacy, but it also stimulates a pluralist political configuration.

Despite the various attempts at revitalization, sporadic and sudden political uplifts and ephemerality of these uplifts continue to characterize the unrecognized states. In times of retardation, their politics reveal a strong tendency toward delegative democracy and conformism. Even if politicians compete in parliamentary and local elections and within the wall of parliament, they tend to create a grand coalition in presidential elections. All the recent presidential elections in the unrecognized states (Abkhazia in 2004, the PMR in 2006, and the NKR in 2007) show that this tendency is strengthening, despite a definite development of their party systems.

The commitment of Russia and Armenia to the domestic politics of the unrecognized states has largely been limited to the role of arbitrator in times of unmanageable intra-elite competition, moreover, with only veto function, as exemplified by the rejection of Babayan's NKR premiership by Yerevan in 1998. It is true that in the Abkhazian presidential election in 2004, Russia tried to propose an option (Khadzhimba's presidency), rather than arbitrate intra-elite competition, but this proposal was rejected twice: first by the voters and secondly by the autonomous solution to the conflict by Abkhazian politicians. With this limited influence, it is difficult to identify the unrecognized states as puppets of Russia or Armenia.

As the small and poor protagonists in this paper, such as Georgia and Moldova, proved their magnificent ability to manipulate "the only superpower in the post-cold war world," the unrecognized states with populations of hundreds of thousands dissipated the Russians' illusive perception of its might and opened their eyes to the geopolitical reality of Eurasia. Perhaps, this "paradox of scale" is the most notable implication revealed by the political processes around the unrecognized states, which might be quite suggestive in predicting the twenty-first-century world.

⁵² The substance of this event was not a repression of Moldovanism, but a personal struggle between Volkova and Babilunga; Moldovanism was used to criticize Babilunga.

REFERENCES

- Апогей информационной войны // Приднестровье. 2006. 28 ноября. С. 1.
- Бабилунга Н.Б., Бомешко Б.Г. Дубоссары: кровотокающая рана Приднестровья. Тирасполь, 1993.
- Бабилунга Н.В. и т.д. Очередной опыт исторического картографирования Приднестровья и его результат // Исторический альманах Приднестровья. 2006. №10. С.184-207.
- Бабилунга Н. Приднестровская Молдавская Республика: признанная историография непризнанного государства // Историографический диалог вокруг непризнанных государств: Приднестровье, Нагорный Карабах, Армения, Южная Осетия и Грузия. Саппоро: Slavic Research Center, 2007. С.12-36.
- Broers L. 2005. The politics of non-recognition and democratization. In *The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process*, edited by Broers L. *Accord* 16. London, Conciliation Resources. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/democratization.php> (Accessed: 7 November 2008).
- Clogg R. 2008. The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia: Managing Diversity and Unresolved Conflict. *Nationalities Papers* 36 (2): 305-329.
- Elgie, R. & S. Moestrup, eds. 2007. *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, ed. London: Routledge.
- Галинский И. Кому-то нужен был большой скандал (интервью руководства Приднестровского госуниверситета). Ружим доступа: www.femina-news.ru/cultural/news_2007-10-16-22-10-03-595.html.
- Гросул В.Я. и др. ред. История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики. Т. 1-2 (Ч. 1-2). Тирасполь: Министерство просвещения ПМР, 2000-2001.
- Иванов С. Спаси и сохрани // Независимая Молдова. 2001. 20 июля. Ружим доступа: www.nm.md/daily/article/2001/07/20/0905.html.
- King C. 2001. The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States. *World Politics* 53 (July): 524-552.
- Kolstø, P., A. Malgin. 1998. The Transnistrian republic: A Case of Politicized Regionalism. *Nationalities Papers* 26 (1): 103-127.
- Kolstø, P. 2006. The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States. *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (6): 723-740.
- Kolstø, P., H. Blakkisrud. 2008. Living with Non-recognition: State- and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-states. *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (3): 483-509.
- Кулик В., Якушик В. План Ющенко по урегулированию приднестровского конфликта и перспективы его реализации // Приднестровье в макрорегиональном контексте черноморского побережья. 2008. Slavic Research Center, 2008. С.160-191. Ружим доступа: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no18_ses/contents.html.
- Лакоба С. 2004а. На заре советской империи. «Я – коба, а ты – Лакоба...» // Лакоба С. Абхазия после двух империй. XIX-XXI вв. Саппоро: Slavic Research Center, 2004. Гл. 4. Ружим доступа: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no5_ses/contents.html.
- Лакоба С. 2004б. Абхазия после двух империй. XIX-XXI вв. Саппоро: Slavic Research Center, 2004. Ружим доступа: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no5_ses/contents.html.

- Lynch, D. 2004. *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Маркедонов С. 2006а. De facto государства постсоветского пространства // Научные тетради Института Восточной Европы. Вып. 1. Непризнанные государства. М., 2006. С.13-27.
- Маркедонов С. 2006б. НКР: Конституция как форма признания// Научные тетради Института Восточной Европы. Вып. 1. Непризнанные государства. М., 2006. С. 152-156.
- Маркедонов С. 2006с. Непризнанную Абхазию признают. // Научные тетради Института Восточной Европы. Вып. 1. Непризнанные государства. М., 2006. С.114-118.
- Matsuzato, K. 2006. Differing Dynamics of Semipresidentialism across Euro/Eurasian Borders: Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova and Armenia. *Demokratizatsiya* 14 (3): 317-345.
- Мацузато К. Патронное президентство и политика в сфере идентичности в непризнанной Абхазии // Acta Eurasica. 2006. № 4. С.132-159.
- Мацузато К. Непризнанные государства: Нагорно-Карабахская Республика (1988-2005 гг.) // Вестник Тамбовского университета. 2007. № 1 (45). С.31-41.
- Mihalkanin, E. The Abkhazians: A National Minority in Their Own Homeland in *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty*, edited by T. Bahcheli et al. 143-162. London & New York: Routledge.
- Moran, D. 2003. Introduction: The Legend of the *Lée en masse*. In *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, edited by D. Moran, A. Waldron, 1 – 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Научные тетради Института Восточной Европы. Вып. 1. Непризнанные государства. Под ред. А. Л. Погрельского. М., 2006.
- Politics 2007. Politics: Karabakh Parties Support Bako Sahakyan, Daily News: NK-related News Compiled from Reliable Sources. May 9, 2007. http://www.nkrusa.org/news/daily_news.php?id=1088 (Accessed: 11 September 2008).
- Popjanevski, J. 2008. Parliamentary Elections in Abkhazia: Opposition on the Rise? Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4605/print> (Accessed: 13 September 2008).
- Приднестровских ученых лишили финансирования за научную критику советника президента? Интервью ИА REGNUM // ИА REGNUM. 2007. 10 августа. Ружим доступа: www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/896191.html.
- Quinlan, P. D. 2004. Back to the Future: An Overview of Moldova Under Voronin. *Demokratizatsiya* 12 (4): 485-504.
- Roper, S. 2004. From Frozen Conflict to Frozen Agreement: The Unrecognized State of Transnistria in *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty*, edited by T. Bahcheli et al. 102 – 117. London & New York: Routledge.
- Roper, S. 2006. Education as an Instrument of Moldovan Identity Formation in *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, edited by O. Ieda et al. 183 – 200. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center. http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no10_ses/contents.html.
- Шорников П.М. Молдавская самобытность. Тирасполь: И-во Приднестровского университета, 2007.
- Skakov A. 2005. Abkhazia at a Crossroads: On the Domestic Political Situation in the Republic of Abkhazia. *Iran and the Caucasus* 9 (1): 159-185.
- Волкова А. Лидер. Тирасполь, 2001.

Волкова А.З. Референдум в Приднестровской Молдавской Республике (1989-2003 гг.). Тирасполь, 2005.

РЕЗЮМЕ

Не легко было жителям непризнанных республик (Нагорный Карабах, Абхазия, Приднестровье), приверженных духу военного героизма, приводить свою жизнь в нормальное русло после достижения перемирия. Играв на послевоенном равнодушии, герои войны сосредоточили в своих руках власть и ресурсы, что привело к отходу от демократических норм. С этой целью здесь могут иметь место две стратегии. Первая – возвращение воюющей демократии и основных норм справедливости. Другая – смещение акцента на мультиэтнический характер республик для использования этнических факторов (например вопросы мингрелов, молдаван) с целью политической мобилизации. Не смотря на то что вторая стратегия доказала свой сдерживающий эффект, для моноэтнического Карабаха она не действует в отличие от Приднестровья и Абхазии.

► KEY WORDS: Unrecognized states (republics), Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Abkhazia. Pridnestr Moldovan Republic. Conflict around South Ossetia

► КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: Непризнанные государства (республики), Нагорный Карабах, Абхазия, Приднестровье, Южно-осетинский конфликт